See article below ref ATA accident at Chicago (Midway). (and the attached article). It doesn't make it clear in the article but reverted rubber skidding can occur on dry heavy rubber deposits. And those deposits tend to cancel out the runway's texture (grooving).... and give a lesser braking efficiency. However wet runways are of course the most hazardous and I think that you will find that manufacturers do not factor in contamination of any sort into their stopping (or rejected take-off) performance ratings. The best you might get is “braking reported good/fair/poor”….if you were to ask.

Now back to the earlier story of ATC having the authority to send an a/c around off a badly judged approach.

Chicago's Midway is an accident in progress. If you look below you'll see that 31C has very heavy rubber deposits. That decreases stoppability in wet weather by a large amount (hydroplaning and reverted rubber aquaplaning (i.e.skidding)). Of course landing "well in" was the cause here - but that's precisely the circumstance where the experienced ATCO should send the airplane around (once he's over the threshold and looking mighty shaky). There is no virtue in the Anchorage style of passive controlling ("This is going to get ugly" ). What is the use of that attitude/approach to safety?

And when you look at the photo below (and those heavy rubber deposits) just reflect upon the likelihood of a real catastrophe resulting from a take-off abort at V1. Having autobrakes doesn't make reverted rubber hydroplaning any less likely.

Perhaps  it should become the new Meigs Field. Mayor Daley could do that overnight with a wave of his magic bulldozer.

This 757-200 crew may have been carrying a thrust reverser unserviceability (but that’s not been confirmed).

link   Rubber Deposits

link  The Value of "Distance to Run" Marker Boards

Extract The commander believed that there was sufficient runway in which to stop even after the long touchdown. The actual landing roll calculated from the FDR data suggests that the aircraft stopped in the expected distance of 2,700 feet. In fact, the deceleration during the final part of the roll was relatively high as the aircraft went onto the soft grass otherwise the landing distance would have been longer. This and the increase in longitudinal 'g' confirm that braking did not begin at the time of touchdown but occurred later, at around the time the commander was able see the end of the runway. Had he applied full brake pressure immediately on touchdown, the aircraft should have stopped on the paved surface but probably beyond the declared landing distance. In most cases, in daylight, once the touchdown zone of a runway is behind an aircraft there is no direct indication to a pilot what remaining length is available other than what he can see ahead. However, the touchdown zone markings for the opposite runway, normally at around 1,000 feet remaining, can sometimes be an indication. In recognition of this problem, some aerodromes have adopted a system of marker boards displaying distance to go information. In the absence of marker boards and any familiarity with the airfield environment, a pilot may not be able to form a good judgement of remaining distance once past the touchdown zone, particularly where, as in this case, there is a significant slope. For this reason, even when there may be excess landing distance available, a landing at the touchdown zone is desirable.

KMDW runway 31C:

Dimensions: 6522 x 150 ft. / 1988 x 46 m
Surface: concrete/grooved, in good condition
Weight limitations: Single wheel: 95000 lbs
Double wheel: 165000 lbs
Double tandem: 250000 lbs

47 ft. road, 200 ft. from runway, 225 ft. left of centerline
APCH RATIO 20:1 AT DSPLCD THR. STREET LGT 650 FT FROM DSPLCD THR 500 FT R.

CLOSE-IN OBST ALL RYS EXCEPT RY 13R/31L TOO NUMEROUS TO ITEMIZE.

4-box VASI on left (3.00 degrees glide path)

Latitude: 41-46.75438N
Longitude: 087-44.62430W
Elevation: 611.7 ft.