Explanation for the TAM A320 Accident's Observed Runway
Events at Congonhas
To be crystal clear, we'll start off with
the conclusion (that's based upon the histories and
observations/links provided below):
a. It would appear that TAM Flt JJ3054 did land a
little far in and a little hot.
b. Once established with the left-hand engine in
reverse and spoilers deployed, it then became apparent to the
handling pilot that a (typical Ibiza style) A320 wheel-braking
failure had occurred (i.e. the never totally resolved BSCU failure
c. Both recognizing and resolving this situation
can be a very runway- and time-consuming affair (see below on 03 Aug
2003 accident to A320 regn C-FTDF at
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources/C-FTDF.pdf ), so the
captain understandably aware of the lethal lack of an overrun,
decided to apply power and go-round.
d. An engine going from full rev to full
forward thrust could possibly suffer a compressor stall while the
reverser doors are closing. The A320 Thrust reverser can take up to 5 secs
to re-stow, so the application of TOGA power caused a predictable
compressor surge on the LH engine well after the RH engine had
gained full power, thus causing the first flash seen on the video
and the divergence (due to the considerable thrust asymmetry) well left of the
e. However even if the pilots did NOT apply power
in an attempt to go round, leaving the throttle of the engine (#1)
with the locked-out reverser up at 22.5 degrees (i.e. not retarding
it to idle at the "retard" call, would allow that engine to
automatically go to TOGA once the auto-throttle disconnected. In
addition the spoilers would not auto-deploy nor the autobrake
operate. It's a nasty trap and a facet of Airbus operation that
isn't often encountered and can easily be overlooked. See what one
pilot said about his own personal experience:
|This, to me, is so relevant; happened to me when I
was a brand new skipper, first flight after a month's
vacation, new FO, dispatch with one reverser inop. First
two sectors went without incident but on the third (FO's
leg) I reminded him of the inop reverser.
Retrospectively he removed his hand completely from that
thrust lever; it was midnight, dark cockpit. At the
flare & "Retard" call he therefore only closed the
"operative" TL. The aircraft squawked "Retard" at least
five times and then after the two second latch, the
engine that still had it's TL in the Climb detent went
to TOGA. Aircraft yawed significantly and came
dangerously close to the edge of the runway (we were at
about 5 feet AGL). I took control, whammed the other TL
closed and got the aircraft back on the black stuff. Was
a long runway, CAVOK & wind calm. Glad it wasn't on a
short, wet strip.
I know the "wait until the investigation" but that's it
Originally Posted by Aviation Safety Council
3.1 Findings Related to
1. When the aircraft was below 20 ft RA and Retard
warnings were sounded, the pilot flying didn’t pull
thrust lever 2 to Idle detent which caused the
ground spoilers to not deploy after touchdown though
they were at Armed position, and therefore the auto
braking system was not triggered.
Moreover, when the auto thrust was changed to manual
operation mode automatically after touchdown, the
thrust lever 2 was remained at 22.5 degrees which
caused the Engine 2 still had an larger thrust
output (EPR1.08) than idle position’s. Thereupon,
the aircraft was not able to complete deceleration
within the residual length of the runway, and
deviated from the runway before came to a full stop,
even though the manual braking was actuated by
the pilot 13 seconds after touchdown
2. The pilot monitoring announced “spoiler” automatically when the
aircraft touched down without checking the ECAM
display first according to SOP before made the
announcement, as such the retraction of ground
was ignored. (2.3.3)
f. Thus probably not a lot to do with the lack of
runway grooving, but possibly directly related to the runway length
and abysmal lack of a usable RESA (Runway End Safety Area)....
and the resulting pilot apprehension.
information above and below is relevant - but dated. A
clearer explanation of findings and a likely scenario is at
the spoilers – if you watch the last few seconds of video a few
times, you might notice the dark area over the wing – it may mean
that the spoilers were up at that late point. If so, that would
probably finish the attempted Go-Around idea. However it's only
surmise and all a bit tenuous.
Better pointers to a likely
cause are contained within the next two accident reviews. The
history of Airbus wheel-braking anomalies as disclosed by the A320
crash at Ibiza then becomes very relevant as the reason for the crew
having attempted a late go-round.
directional control problems in the America West A320 accident below
is pertinent as it was the RH (#2) thrust reverser on the TAM A320
that was OUT of SERVICE. The TAM crew ended up well LEFT of
centerline in impacting the TAM Cargo Building so that divergence to
the LEFT would be easily explained by the RH engine being
intentionally TOGA'd (i.e. the button-pressed for go-round power).
The braking fault (see later) would have been the reason for them
NEEDING to go round.
from N635AW accident (next below):
an effort at maintaining directional control, the captain then moved
the #1 thrust lever out of reverse and inadvertently moved it to the
Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust
lever in the full reverse position."
Not sure this throttle movement is possible on a 737 but it appears
so on an AB. It may be relevant to the TAM accident - and perhaps it
needs to be looked at by AirBus.
|NTSB Identification: LAX02FA266.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of
AMERICA WEST AIRLINES (D.B.A. America
Accident occurred Wednesday, August 28, 2002 in Phoenix, AZ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 9/13/2005
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie
A320-231, registration: N635AW
Injuries: 1 Serious, 9 Minor, 149 Uninjured.
After an asymmetrical deployment of the
thrust reversers during landing rollout deceleration, the captain
failed to maintain directional control of the airplane and it veered
off the runway, collapsing the nose gear and damaging the forward
fuselage. Several days before the flight the #1 thrust reverser had
been rendered inoperative and mechanically locked in the stowed
position by maintenance personnel. In accordance with approved
minimum equipment list (MEL) procedures, the airplane was allowed to
continue in service with a conspicuous placard noting the
inoperative status of the #1 reverser placed next to the engine's
thrust lever. When this crew picked up the airplane at the departure
airport, the inbound crew briefed the captain on the status of the
#1 thrust reverser. The captain was the flying pilot for this leg of
the flight and the airplane touched down on the centerline of the
runway about 1,200 feet beyond its threshold. The captain moved both
thrust levers into the reverse position and the airplane began
yawing right. In an effort at
maintaining directional control, the captain then moved the #1
thrust lever out of reverse and inadvertently moved it to the
Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust
lever in the full reverse position.
The thrust asymmetry created by the left engine at TOGA power
with the right engine in full reverse greatly increased the right
yaw forces, and they were not adequately compensated for by the
crew's application of rudder and brake inputs. Upon veering off the
side of the runway onto the dirt infield, the nose gear strut
collapsed. The airplane slid to a stop in a nose down pitch
attitude, about 7,650 feet from the threshold. There was no fire.
Company procedures required the flying pilot (the captain) to give
an approach and landing briefing to the nonflying pilot (first
officer). The captain did not brief the first officer regarding the
thrust reverser's MEL'd status, nor was he specifically required to
do so by the company operations manual. Also, the first officer did
not remind the captain of its status, nor was there a specific
requirement to do so. The operations manual did state that the
approach briefing should include, among other things, "the landing
flap setting...target airspeed...autobrake level (if desired)
consistent with runway length, desired stopping distance, and any
special problems." The airline's crew resource management procedures
tasked the nonflying pilot to be supportive of the flying pilot and
backup his performance if pertinent items were omitted from the
approach briefing. The maintenance, repair history, and
functionality of various components associated with the airplane's
directional control systems were evaluated, including the brake
system, the nose landing gear strut and wheels, the brakes, the
antiskid system, the thrust levers and reversers, and the throttle
control unit. No discrepancies were found regarding these
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable
cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The captain's failure to maintain directional control and his
inadvertent application of asymmetrical engine thrust while
attempting to move the #1 thrust lever out of reverse. A factor in
the accident was the crew's inadequate coordination and crew
Full narrative available
||09 JUL 2006
|C/n / msn:
||2 Pratt & Whitney PW4152
||Fatalities: 5 / Occupants: 8
||Fatalities: 120 / Occupants: 195
||Fatalities: 125 / Occupants: 203
||Irkutsk Airport (IKT) (Russia)
||Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Moskva-Domodedovo Airport (DME/UUDD), Russia
Irkutsk Airport (IKT/UIII), Russia
Sibir flight 778 departed Domodeovo (DME) at
night for a flight to Irkutsk (IKT). Weather at Irkutsk was poor. It
was raining, overcast clouds at 600 feet and a thunderstorm in the
area. The Airbus landed on runway 30 (concrete, 3165 m / 10343 feet
long). Since the no.1 engine
thrust reverser on the airplane was de-activated, this engine's
thrust was brought back to idle. The no.2 engine thrust reversers
were deployed normally. While handling the throttles, the pilot
inadvertently touched the no.1 power lever, increasing engine thrust
and causing a loss of directional control. The co-pilot did
not adequately monitor the engine parameters and failed to note the
lack of deceleration. At a speed of approx. 80 km/h the Airbus
overran the runway. It collided with a concrete barrier and burst
Weather around the time of the accident (23:00 UTC / 08:00 local)
was: UIII 082300Z 28005MPS 3500 -SHRA OVC006CB 11/09 Q1002 NOSIG RMK
QBB190 QFE707/0943 30290250= (Wind 280 degrees at 5m/sec visibility
3500m, light rain showers, 8 oktas overcast cloud at 600ft with
thunder clouds, temperature 11C dewpoint 9C, QNH 1002hPa no
"When he pressed the switch for the
reversing system, located between the pilots' seats, with one finger
of his right hand, Shibanov most likely bumped the handle that
controlled the left, deactivated engine, located only centimeters
away, with his other fingers. As a result, he simultaneously turned
on the right reversing system and left takeoff system and the
plane picked up speed, turning to the right, hitting garages and
bursting into flames.
questioned by Kommersant say that the cause of the crash should be
attributed to the error of the dispatcher and the unfortunate design
of the plane's cockpit: the controls for the throttle and the
reversing system can be pressed simultaneously when reaching for
only one of them, especially in an emergency situation. On an
aircraft of that class, it would be possible electronically to
prevent the activation of the forward throttle while turning on the
Flight 794 departed Houston with a an
inoperative nr. 1 thrust reverser. On August 20, 2002,
the number one thrust reverser had been deactivated by
maintenance personnel. The airplane touched down at
Phoenix on the centerline of runway 08 about 1,200 feet
beyond its threshold. During rollout the captain
positioned both thrust levers into reverse but then took
the number one thrust lever out of the reverse position
and inadvertently moved it to the Take-Off/Go-Around
(TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust lever in
the full reverse position. Full left rudder and full
left brake application did not compensate for the yaw.
The airplane continued swerving to the right until
exiting the right side of the runway. It crossed the
apron east of intersection B8, and experienced the
collapse and partial separation of its nose gear strut
assembly upon traversing the dirt infield area south of
the runway between intersections B9 and B10.
"The captain's failure to maintain
directional control and his inadvertent application of
asymmetrical engine thrust while attempting to move the
#1 thrust lever out of reverse. A factor in the accident
was the crew's inadequate coordination and crew resource
Flight PR 137 was a regular scheduled
passenger flight and departed Manila for Bacolod at
18:40. The airplane departed with the thrust reverser of
engine nr.1 inoperative.
||22 MAR 1998
Philippine Air Lines
|C/n / msn:
|Total airframe hrs:
||2 CFMI CFM56-5B4
||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6
||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 124
||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 130
||Bacolod Airport (BCD) (Philippines)
||Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Manila International Airport (MNL/RPLL),
Bacolod Airport (BCD/RPVB), Philippines
At 19:20, PR137 called Bacolod Approach Control and
reported passing FL260 and 55 DME to Bacolod . The crew
then requested landing instructions and was instructed
to descend to FL90 after passing Iloilo and descend to
3,000 ft for a VOR runway 04 approach. Wind was 030° at
08 kts, altimeter 1014 mbs, transition level at FL60 and
temperature at 28°C .At 19:28, the flight requested to
intercept the final approach to runway 04 and Approach
Control replied "PR 137 visual approach on final" . At
19:37, Bacolod Tower cleared the flight to land at
runway 04 and the clearance was acknowledged by the
The approach was flown with the Autothrust system
engaged in SPEED mode. The thrust lever of engine no.1
was left in Climb detent. Upon touchdown the first
officer called out "no spoilers, no reverse, no decel".
Engine no.2 was set to full reverse thrust after
touchdown, but the engine no .1 thrust lever was not
retarded to idle and remained in the climb power
position. Consequently, the spoilers did not deploy.
Because one engine was set to reverse, the autothrust
system automatically disengaged. With the autothrust
disengaged, nr.1 engine thrust increased to climb
thrust. Due to the asymmetrical thrust condition, the
A320 ran off the right side of the runway. At this
speed, rudder and nosewheel steering are ineffective.
Engine no.2 was moved out of reverse up to more than 70
percent N1 and the airplane swerved back onto the
runway. The A320 continued past the runway end. The
aircraft hit the airport perimeter fence and then jumped
over a small river. It continued to slice through a
hallow block fence where it went through several
clusters of shanties and trees. No fire ensued after the
"The probable cause of this accident was
the inability of the pilot flying to assess properly the
situational condition of the aircraft immediately upon
touch down with No. 1 engine reverse inoperative,
thereby causing an adverse flight condition of extreme
differential power application during the landing roll
resulting in runway excursion and finally an overshoot.
Contributory to this accident is the apparent lack of
technical systems knowledge and lack of appreciation of
the disastrous effects of misinterpreting provisions and
requirements of a Minimum Equipment List (MEL).
Transasia A320 mishap:
Runway Overrun During Landing On Taipei Sungshan Airport
October 18, 2004
TRANSASIA AIRWAYS FLIGHT 536
Reference the thrust levers on the Bus...
it's not a single piece, it consists of 2 things.
1. The thrust lever
2. Reverse latching levers.
To actuate thrust reverse:
Thrust lever to idle
pull the reverse latching levers... this actuates idle reverse
Pull thrust lever to the rear for more reverse thrust.
Requires both main landing gears to be compressed for a full On The
Ground detection, AND
A thrust reverse signal fed through at least one of the Spoiler
Elevator Computer. The signal from the SEC opens the reversers
hydraulic shut off valve to prevent its deployment without this
Actuation of reversers will have FADEC commanding IDLE. Once IDLE is
attained, it will go to idle reverse, complete the reverser sleeves
deployment before going beyond idle reverse.
go with a one reverser inop scenario, it's actually pretty simple.
1. Pilot selects Reversers on 1 or both engines
2. Pilot then selects a go-around.
On the reverser actuation, refer to the above. BUT, 1 engine remains
on forward idle.
On go-round selection:
the engine with the reverse inop will go straight to TOGA
the engine with the operating reverser will:
1. Select thrust to TOGA and stow the reverser sleeves.
2. Idle Thrust Protection will immediately kick in because no
reverse thrust is selected and the sleeves are still in transition
3. Idle thrust will remain on the engine despite TOGA power
selection until no HYD pressure is detected downstream of the Hyd
Control unit on the reverser.
This theoretically should only take moments, but ideally, one should
select idle, check the reversers have been stowed and no pressure is
detected downstream of the reverser HCU (Reversers stowed indicated
on the ECAM), then go to TOGA. However, in emergencies, this should
not be a problem because the FADEC and reverser mechanism should
take care of it... however, the delay even if only for a second,
could result in asymmetrical thrust.
This is why on Boeings (and Buses), it is not recommended to
go-around after reversers have been deployed because, in the haste
of things, the pilot could select TOGA before the reversers are
stowed and HYD Press gone to zero, which puts a risk on the engine
at TOGA on accidental reverse deployment due to hyd pressure being
present downstream of the reverser control unit. Should it be
necessary, the safest way is to wait and confirm on the engine
instruments that the reversers have been stowed prior to going to
TOGA, both on Bus or Boeing. This is why people and companies have
tried to keep it simple, i.e. no go-around after reverser
deployment. It's just too risky.
to five seconds are required for a reverser to close in the forward
Add to that another 5-8
secs for a spool up to max thrust.
And this makes interesting reading...
now......on the Subject of the Wheelbraking
Anomalies Experienced by the Airbus family
(The Cause of the Go-Round
On the A320 there is a recall drill (not on ECAM) for 'Loss of
Braking'? It resulted from the A320 overrun accident at Ibiza
It relates to no-notice BSCU failure (Brakes, Steering and Control
Unit) and requires prompt recall action by the crew.....
as there's nil braking available.....
It requires quickly switching the A/Skid & N/W Strg switch off and
then manually braking with max 1000psi pressure.
(see page 50/105 at
the above link).
However, as the toe-brakes on the rudder pedals don't go flat to the
floor in this case (under manual braking) and the deceleration due
to two-engine reverse approximates the retardation from a low
autobrake setting, it's not always clear, early on, that braking has
If that A/Skid & N/W Strg switch cycling proved unsuccessful, then
you were supposed to use short and successive applications of the
It became a published procedure, so I presume that it has happened
to the extent that Airbus had to devise a new FCOM procedure.
|In the event of a failure on a short slippery
runway, determining the cause for the lack of braking
may well be very difficult in the heat of the moment,
no? The lack of
braking/ restricted choices may force an otherwise
desperate go-round decision, ....thus explaining the TAM
Do not attempt a go around once the aircraft is
on the runway
and reverse thrust is initiated. Up to five seconds are
for a reverser to close in the forward thrust position.
is a possibility that the reverser will not stow in the
position during a go around attempt."
|1. For BSCU
Problems on 777 and Airbus (see pg 7 of
continuing in 2007 (items 318 to 322 inclusive) and
this link (items 206 thru 208)
"As our BSCU components continue to
age, we are seeing a higher frequency of BSCU Channel Faults (X)
almost exclusively on the older style Conventional BSCU PN
C202163382D32. In most cases 86% of the time, these faults are
simply corrected by cycling the A/SKD and N/W STRG switches off,
then on, or with a computer/circuit breaker reset."
|The BSCU performs a
functional test on selection of Landing Gear Down,
... The BSCU then sends current momentarily
to the NSVs and monitors the pressure ...
- 29k -
|The BSCU is a
two-channel computer that controls anti-skid and
autobrake ... Alternate braking without anti-skid
(pedal-braking due to BSCU failure or ...
- 27k -
Note also the (likely) similar (to TAM Flight JJ3054) 03 Aug 2003
accident to A320 regn C-FTDF
showed that it took 10 to 13 seconds for the commander to recognise
the lack of pedal
there was no overt warning from the ECAM of the malfunction of the
safety recommendations were
made to the aircraft manufacturer regarding improved warnings and
crew procedures." (pg 1 of
Data from C-FTDF's FDR was analysed by
the aircraft manufacturer and the analysis agreed with
sequence of events reported by the
pilots. On the approach, data was lost from the BSCU (as
indicated by the brake pedal position
transducers and 'autobrake fault' parameter) for a
starting 53 seconds before touchdown,
corresponding to the airborne cycling of the
switch at about
1,000 feet. The changes at about this time in the
parameters indicate that the cycling of
the switch resulted in a change of active channel in the
and the loss of autobrake arming.
The FDR traces showed that, after the
touchdown, the spoilers extended in about two seconds
reverse thrust was initiated at the same
time. The deceleration rose to 0.18g in the six seconds
touchdown, due to the spoilers and idle
reverse thrust, but, by the time the pilot brake pedal
started (eight seconds after touchdown),
the rate of deceleration was reducing. The brake pedals
were progressively applied over a period
of 10 seconds to maximum and back to zero deflection
the next three seconds.
This confirms that pedal braking
was not effective, even at large deflections.
The decline in deceleration rate was
arrested 19 seconds after touchdown with the application
maximum reverse thrust by the crew,
which alone resulted in the deceleration rate reaching
Evidence of pedal braking was apparent
28 seconds after touchdown, with a rapid rise in
deceleration to about 0.4g, punctuated
by three sharp 'spikes', probably corresponding to the
of the three mainwheel tyres. The
aircraft came to rest 50 seconds after touchdown.
Data was again lost from the BSCU for a
period starting 23 seconds after touchdown (at about 78
ground speed), consistent with the
crew's reported cycling, and then turning off, the
Effective pedal braking was
apparent at 28 seconds after touchdown, five
Note that the TAM crew
would have applied power to go round by this elapsed
A simple analysis of the available FDR
traces by the AAIB indicated that the runway distance
covered during the 10 seconds of the
gradual initial application of pedal braking was some
590 metres. The analysis also showed
that this would have been reduced if full reverse thrust
been selected with the initial
application of pedal braking. By comparison, the cycling
of the A/SKID
switch covered about 120 metres of runway, as it
occurred over a much shorter period
and at a lower ground speed.
The records of
typical UK operators of A319/320/321 aircraft indicate
that 'loss of braking' events
following touchdown are infrequent. However, over a
three-year period one UK
operator of A320
aircraft reported a total of five ASRs (Air Safety
Reports) featuring apparent
failure of the
braking system during landings. These incidents are
potentially very hazardous, as
shown in the
report into the accident to a UK-registered Airbus
A320-212, G-UKLL, at Ibiza Airport
Safety Recommendation 2004-83
It is recommended that Airbus amend the
Flight Crew Operating Manuals, and related material, to
application of maximum reverse thrust as soon as a loss
of braking performance is suspected
following touchdown, rather than delay
the application whilst awaiting confirmation that no
( 1996 ) (link)
(and AD 93-15-05 of 1993 -
"requires replacement of the
relays in the forward electronics rack of the braking
system of the landing gear with new relays. This
amendment is prompted by reports of loss of the systems
of the braking/steering control unit (BSCU) on these
airplanes due to electrical overvoltage of the relays.
The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent
such electrical overvoltage of the relays, which could
result in the loss of the BSCU systems, and subsequent
loss of the antiskid functions and nose wheel steering
of the airplane."
Airbus General Emergency AD
(AD 2002-06-53) at
link refers to induced general computer failures
that include the loss of BSCU functions.
that the shaky old BSCU also features in the A320 family's 90 degree
cocked off nosewheel landings. (
"An event where an A320 landed with the Nose Landing
Gear (NLG) wheels rotated at 90 degrees to the aircraft centerline
was recently reported. Investigation showed that the upper support
of the NLG shock absorber was damaged and the anti-rotation lugs
were ruptured. This led the nose wheels to loose their centered
position reference normally ensured by the shock-absorber cams. The
Braking and Steering Control Unit (BSCU) had logged a steering
system fault, because hydraulic power was not available at the time
of steering system checks, therefore the BSCU was not able to
proceed with the re-centering of the wheels.
To prevent reoccurrence of landings with NLG turned
90 degrees, AD F-2005-191 that dealt with the same subject, rendered
mandatory an operational procedure and maintenance actions."
|The BSCU problem has also been experienced on
Airbus A330 and A340 (link
to applicable AD 98-03-04 )
Flash on the Video
A comment on the flash visible from the left side of the aircraft on
the video just before it disappears from view...
One hypothesis: Reverse thrust was selected on Eng
1 (eng 2 rev thrust was deactivated). Pilots realized they would not
be able to stop the aircraft and, contrary to the recommendations of
the FCOM (Flight Crew Operating Manual) to always execute a full
stop once reverse thrust (TR) is selected, initiated a go-around by
pushing the thrust levers to TOGA. An engine going from full rev to
full forward thrust could possibly suffer a compressor stall while
the reverser doors are closing, causing the flash we see in the
Of course, they may have considered it was safer to try to get
airborne again... if they had experienced a BSCU-induced
wheel-braking failure. The problem may
then have become the same thrust asymmetry of the accidents
of registrations: N635AW and F-OGYP (the two incidents in cells 2
and 3 above).
- 17:03 LT - GOL B 737-800 lands at CGH and reports "slippery
- 17:04 LT - INFRAERO, local airport manager, closes the airport for
landing and takeoff ops. INFRAERO engineers measures the standing
water: 0,6 mm.
- 17:30 LT - Airport returns to normal ops.
- 18:50 LT - PR-MBK lands at CGH, overruns and crashes.
Remark: Between 1730 and 1850, 40 aircraft (the majority of
them were airliners - B 737 and A319/320) landed at CGH and no
problem was reported. This increases the likelihood of it having
been attributable to a technical malfunction on TAM's Flt JJ3054.
Judging by the water spray seen on the video, it would appear that
its #1 Rev was deployed and probably at full thrust. If a go around
was attempted after TR deployment on #1, which is highly not
recommended of course, the right engine would spool immediately and
the left would have to come out of reverse and then start to spool
up well after the right engine. The results of the thrust asymmetry
would probably follow the tracking on the Google earth picture
posted below which is a faithful illustration of what the security
The flash at the end of the video
might have been a tire burst, LH engine ingesting fence
bits or, more likely, a compressor stall due to TOGA
power being applied rapidly while the LH engine's
reversers was still stowing.
Part of the aircraft did graze a car on the road below.
TAM has now put its A320 MEL on their public website, probably in
response to the press coverage of the T/R issue