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-----Original
Message-----
From: David P Evans
[mailto:DEvans@pbimedia.com]
Sent: Friday, August 15, 2003 5:41 AM
To: 'jerry.w.cox@cox.net'; 'katie.lamb@ngc.com'; 'jack.pledger@ngc.com'; 'safety@iasa-intl.com'
Subject: LAIRCM to the rescue
To
all:
Draft article pasted below for
review. I am
including Air Safety Week contributing editor IASA Australasia, as he is
intimately familiar with the subject and has an excellent eye for typos and
such.
I cannot let this article grow. Hold your
suggestions to a minimum, primarily to preserve accuracy. Need
feedback soonest; comments must be received NLT 9:00 a.m. Friday.
Thanks for your time and assistance.
David
Please review this
Terrorist Missile Attacks on
Airliners Could be Blunted With Belly-Mounted Defensive System
Hundreds of
aircraft could be retrofitted in 28 months from 'go' order
The missile threat to commercial airliners burst into public view last week,
the arrest of three illegal arms dealers bent on acquiring the lethal SA-18
portable missile receiving the full media "treatment."
What best to do about the risk from an operational and hardware standpoint is
another matter. Spiraling descents and take-offs to
minimize exposure to surface-to-air missiles would dramatically reduce
airport capacity, not to mention the dramatic increase in passengers' use of
airsick bags.
Installing defensive hardware to airliners involves added weight, another demand
on aircraft electrical power, and an additional item to maintain.
These
considerations may pale in the face of the penalty for doing nothing.
There is no question that a successful missile attack on a U.S.
airliner would shut down the industry, and keep it grounded until aircraft
were retrofitted with defensive systems. Not only would passengers refuse to
fly, so would pilots - especially if they were to embrace a concept outlined
recently in Canada.
Under the Canada Labor Code, employees have a right to refuse dangerous work
and, as indicated in a Transport Canada
safety letter, that coverage includes pilots (see box EMBRACE).
Capt.
Paul Onorato of the Coalition of Airline
Pilots Associations (CAPA) described portable missiles as "an
immediate threat to commercial aircraft worldwide." He reiterated CAPA's
support for legislation introduced earlier this year by Sen.
Barbara Boxer (D - Calif.)
that would mandate installation of defense systems on all airliners (see ASW, March 3, p. 7).
Calls
in the U.S. Congress for such a retrofit are
mirrored overseas.
Arch Bevis, member of Australia's
parliament, declared, "It seems to me a major flaw in Australia's
approach to these things that we are not requiring at least Qantas aircraft
going to high risk locations to have appropriate countermeasures
installed."
"This
is a threat that exists today," Bevis added. "For us not to be
taking action, as a parliament or for the government not to be taking action
or indeed Qantas itself not to be taking action, I think is negligence."
Evil undone
Bevis' remarks followed the Aug. 12 arrest of three men, one at Newark
and two in New York, bent on
obtaining missiles to employ against U.S.
airliners. The timely arrests illustrate that the most effective means of
blunting the threat begins long before terrorist "triggermen" can
get into firing position in the environs of an airport.
Just as the hardened cockpit door is the last line of a layered system of
security against hijacking, a proactive
defence would extend all the way to counter-offensive operations in
the terrorists' presumed "safe" havens. A tiered defence against man-portable air defense
systems (MANPADS) involves first reaching out and intercepting the threat
before it gets close to an airliner.
This paramount imperative was amply
demonstrated in the coordinated U.S.-British-Russian
"sting" operation that left the plotters with nothing but a
harmless decoy missile for their money.
This success in the shadowy war
against terrorism may not "sting" again however. Notwithstanding this one tactical
triumph, the threat persists - and because of the publicity, may be worsening. The
unsuccessful attack on a departing Israeli B757 charter jet Nov. 28, 2002, at Mombasa,
Kenya, involved the
launch of two SA-7 heat-seeking missiles. Industry sources speculate the
missiles may have been launched prematurely by anxious gunners, and perhaps
too close to the airliner to stabilize and lock onto the target (the
potential role of defensive avionics on Israeli airliners, often rumored, has
not entered public discussions of the incident). The missiles used may also have been
training models (i.e. with built-in safety limitations).
The lethal needle
The subject of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
other government agencies' sting operation was the illegal sale of the SA-18
"Igla" missile (Igla is Russian for "Needle," the symbol
of which is emblazoned on the weapon), an advanced successor to the SA-7.
As one industry source said, it is quite possible that "everyone who shouldn't have it,
now does have it."
The
Russians have sold the SA-18 to North
Korea, Vietnam
and Iran. A
navalized version of the SA-18 has been sold to India.
Last year, the Israelis attempted to block the sale of SA-18s to Syria.
Some reports suggest that Palestinian cells have been trained in Iraq
to employ the SA-18.
Although
at least seven fatal attacks against commercial airlines have occurred from
1996 to 2000, killing more than 300, the SA-18 has not yet been used in this
deadly role.
With a time of flight of 7-15 seconds (depending upon firing position and
relative direction of the target aircraft's flight), the SA-18 has a slant
range of about three miles and a maximum altitude of more than 11,000 feet.
Its infrared (IR) guidance system is claimed to offer better protection
against electro-optical jammers.
According to defense industry literature, the SA-18 has a single-shot kill
probability against unprotected military fighters of 30-48 percent, and it's suggested that the use of infrared
countermeasures (IRCMs) only degrades
the missile's effectiveness some 20 percent, to a single-shot kill
probability of 24-30 percent.
However,
so-called directed IRCM countermeasures (DIRCM) may be more effective.
"We are all about directed IRCM's," declared Jack Pledger, director
of IRCM business development at Northrop
Grumman [NYSE: NOC]. He and other Northrop Grumman officials have
proposed retrofitting onto commercial aircraft a variant of the company's
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM). This defensive system is
used to protect many large military jets, such as the C-17, the KC-10 and
B737, the latter two of which are very similar to their commercial cousins.
Foiling the attack
In contrast to flares or strobe lights, Pledger said, "Our LAIRCM allows
us to direct much higher energy on the missile seeker."
The
defensive system would be mounted in an upside-down "canoe" shaped
pod on the belly of the airplane (see
BOX INSTALLATION).
Four fixed sensors, each with a 120º field of view, are arrayed in the pod to
cover forward, aft, left and right.
The overlapping coverage perspectives of these "staring
sensors" would provide full 360 coverage.
Operating
in the ultraviolet range (UV), the sensors are designed to detect the
distinct spectral "signature" of a missile launch.
Working in the UV bandwidth allows for better discrimination of a missile
launch from background clutter.
Alerted
by the staring sensors, a rotating scanner working in the infrared (IR)
bandwidth (to further discriminate a missile threat from clutter) tracks the
inbound missile.
It quickly transmits a narrow laser beam of IR energy in a modulated,
classified waveform.
This energy disrupts with the missile's tracking system logic,
causing it to break IR lock and steer
off course and away from the airplane.
If the
airplane is attacked at close range (e.g., Mombasa
scenario), as little as three seconds will elapse from missile detection to its divert. At longer ranges, total LAIRCM engagement time would be of the order of 6-7 seconds.
The
combination of UV and IR detection
and tracking (UV detection and
IR tracking and seduction??) has much to do with the system's
effectiveness, Pledger proclaimed.
How well does it work? Pledger said LAIRCM is designed to defeat all missiles
on the U.S.
military's threat list. Stressing the word "all," Pledger implied
that the SA-18 is on that list.
The
system has undergone successful operational tests.
"The military requirement was to defeat multiple threats in the air, which
we have demonstrated in live firing tests," Pledger added.
Deploying defenses
Pledger said the concept envisioned by Northrop Grumman would involve
installing LAIRCM on four airliners, representing a mix of narrowbody and widebody
airplanes, for purposes of Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) flight tests. "We can be ready for
FAA-authorized flight tests in nine months from the decision date,"
Pledger said.
He estimated that FAA certification could be obtained within three months.
This
timeline suggests that a defensive system for airliners could be tested and
certified for deployment in 12 months.
Northrop Grumman officials envision partial deployment, initially to 300
airplanes in the U.S.
fleet. This population includes those large jets flying to destinations
"outside U.S.
borders," Pledger said. Most of these aircraft also are in the Civilian
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
CRAF aircraft often fly to the same locations as military aircraft already
protected by LAIRCM systems.
Thus, the first-stage retrofit to these 300 airliners would provide near-term
protection for international flights and for mobilization aircraft.
From
contract award to completion of the 300th aircraft, the work could
be done in 28 months, Pledger estimated.
That schedule implies an average retrofit rate of slightly more than 10
airplanes per month.
The work would be done during C or D checks.
Cost would average $2 million per plane, including design and
FAA-certification costs.
The commercial version of LAIRCM would be common among all aircraft.
It can operate on 28 volt DC or 115 volt AC aircraft power, further
simplifying fleetwide installation.
"It's the leisure suit approach, one size fits all," Pledger
quipped.
A specific adapter plate is all that would be required for each model of
airplane, he explained.
In March 20 testimony to the House Aviation Subcommittee about the missile
threat, Dr.
Robert DelBoca, Northrop Grumman's vice president for infrared
countermeasures systems, said the military's LAIRCM system is "proven,
effective, affordable means of providing [missile] protection to America's
airline industry and our flying public."
More to the point, he added, "It is available now."
Even so, the retrofit program envisioned by Northrop Grumman may not be
aggressive enough. Retrofitting 300 airplanes over a period in excess of
three years (12 months to test and certify + 28 months to retrofit) covers
less than ten percent of the U.S.
fleet. This schedule implies that it could take a decade or more to retrofit
the entire U.S.
fleet. Expanding the retrofit program to cover a larger fraction of the more
than 4,000 jetliners estimated to be in U.S.
service would drop the installation cost to $1 million. Northrop Grumman
officials estimate the entire fleet could be equipped in a six-year period at
a total cost of around $3 billion (which places the average cost below $1
million per airplane).
In the
meantime, the loss of a single jetliner - from a regional jet to a widebody -
on any flight in the U.S.,
not just overseas, would be intolerable. Q
BOX
INSTALLAITON
Notional
installation on a commercial aircraft of a lightweight defensive antimissile
system.
Self-contained in the conformal pod, the 300-lb.
system would detect and counter any threat missiles launched at the aircraft
without pilot interaction.
Note the four 'staring' UV sensors, and the mechanically slewed IR tracker,
which also transmits the IR energy to divert the inbound missile.
Source: Northrop Grumman
BOX
GROUSE
The
SA-18 man-portable air defense missile is the Russian version of the U.S.
Stinger missile and is known in the Pentagon as the 'Stinger-ski.'
A heat-seeking missile, the SA-18s 4-lb.
warhead is fitted with a contact and grazing fuse.
With its improved sensor, the weapon has an inherent flare rejection
capability, and its actual maximum altitude may be as high as 14,000 ft.,
although most published descriptions place its maximum altitude closer to
11,000 feet.
Compiled from various sources but see www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-18.htm
BOX
SINGLE MAN
The SA-18 is a true man-portable anti-aircraft missile - not a crewed weapon.
Source: www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-18.htm
BOX
EMBRACE
A Concept Pilots Might Embrace
In the event of a successful missile attack on an airliner
From
Transport Canada,
Aviation Safety Letter 3/2002 (extracts):
"The
Canada Labour Code ...
provides employees with three basic rights:
iThe
right to know;
iThe
right to participate; and
iThe
right to refuse dangerous work.
For pilots, refusals to work in
dangerous, or potentially dangerous, situations could occur under a variety
of scenarios, including:
iSecurity
issues on board aircraft;
iConcerns
about improperly packaged, loaded or secured cargo;
iPressures
to complete flight on schedule; or
iDeteriorating
weather conditions.
While not meant to be an
exhaustive list, the above are possible situations that could result in a
pilot having reasonable cause to believe that taking-off or continuing flight
constitutes a danger, or a potential danger, to themselves or others.
Should a pilot believe an operation is dangerous, for whatever reason, he or
she would be acting within his or her legal right to refuse to work."
BOX AIRPORT
Threat Area of Primary Concern
Schematic
above captures the problem of area defense on the ground versus point defense
in the air.
Given the capabilities of current MANPADS, launch area denial would involve
clearing and covering an area of 300 sq miles
or more.
Consider this the area defense approach.
Installation of a defensive system on the airplane, the point defense
approach, may be cheaper and more consistently effective. Source: Northrop Grumman with ASW comments
BOX
OPPOSING VIEWS
Premeditated Mass Murder versus Protection
4The would-be agent of attack:
United States of America
vs. Hemant Lakhani (arrested Aug. 12), criminal complaint filed Aug. 11, U.S.
District Court of New Jersey,
Attachment A (extracts):
"Defendant
Lakhani and the CW [cooperating witness] discussed Usama bin Laden.
Defendant Lakhani sated ...
that bin Laden 'straightened them all out' and 'did a good thing.'
"
"Defendant
Lakhani and the CW ...
discussed the importation of surface-to-air missiles into the United States ...
In a recorded conversation ...
regarding delays in completing the deal, defendant Lakhani stated that he
understood the buyer of the missile wanted it for 'the anniversary,' a
reference to the upcoming anniversary of the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11, 2001."
"On
or about Aug. 20, 2002,
defendant Lakhani faxed to the CW in New Jersey
a document listing the price for an 'Igla-S' portable anti-aircraft
missile."
"In
a recorded conversation ... defendant Lakhani made an apparent reference to
the model of surface-to-air missile used n the Kenya
attack, stating 'ours is much higher quality.' "
"On
or about July 25, 2003,
defendant Lakhani faxed to the CW a copy of the bill of lading ... indicating
that the goods being shipped were 'medical equipment.' Also in or about
late July ... Lakhani and the CW discussed ... the larger deal for the
purchase of [50] surface-to-air
missiles."
4The would-be defender:
Dr. Robert DelBoca, VP Infrared Countermeasures Systems, Northrop Grumman,
March 20 testimony to House Transportation Aviation Subcomittee (extracts):
"MANPADS
are easy to use, require minimal training, and can be set up to fire in less
than three minutes ...
Unfortunately, they are available on the arms black market [and] at least 27
terrorist ...
groups are believed to have MANPADS in their arsenals."
"Numerous civilian aircraft have been shot down and over 350 deaths were
attributed to terrorist-launched MANPADS between 1996 and 2002."
"I am here today to say that if the U.S. Government elects to take steps
to protect commercial aircraft ... our Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system can be easily configured to protect
commercial airliners. LAIRCM is the latest version of our AN/AAQ-24(V) IRCM
[infrared countermeasure] system and provides protection using a multi-band
laser jammer.
With our [system] we will protect over 300 military aircraft, approximately
100 of them large jet aircraft such as the C-17, B-737, KC-10 and KC-135."
"The high level of confidence in the AN/AAQ-24(V) reflects the extensive
government investment in the testing and deployment of this system ...We
have conducted more than 200,000 jamming effectiveness tests and successfully
completed over 100 live-fire missile engagements."
"Instead
of the internal installation used on military aircraft, we are proposing a
small, relatively unobtrusive conformal pod installed
on the lower rear of each aircraft type.
This approach would minimize the amount of integration required with other
aircraft systems, reduce installation time to less than a week, and allow the
system to be fully tested prior to installation."
"This conformal pod does not compromise the effectiveness of LAIRCM
because the flight patterns of commercial aircraft are not as robust ads as
the flight patterns of military aircraft.
After installation, the system operates without pilot or flight-crew action
to defeat missiles.
The system has a built-in self test similar to [other] avionics systems."
"The bottom line is that LAIRCM is in production and will protect
commercial aircraft."
Sources: U.S. District Court, New Jersey, and U.S. Congress
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