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|   | **Reasonably Indicative of the Likely Fate of MH370** *(if tied in with the data at the links below and their internal links)* |
|   |  ----- Original Message ----- **From:**xxxxxxxxx@iinet.net.au **To:**"JOHN KING" <john.king19@comcast.net> **Sent:**Wed, 16 May 2018 00:26:21 +0800 **Subject:**Re: VERY INTERESTING-------Re: \*\*Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The\*\*<https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.html> I've now been banned and locked out of Pprune (yet again)..... and my last post below (my reply to "Wiggy") has been deleted from the thread (i.e. the link above).What further proof does anybody need? Boeing owns PPRUNE.ORG and its hierarchy is hypersensitive to the likely truth about MH370.J S ----- Original Message ----- **From:**xxxxxxxxx@iinet.net.au **To:**"JOHN KING" <john.king19@comcast.net> **Cc:** **Sent:**Tue, 15 May 2018 23:57:45 +0800 **Subject:**Re: VERY INTERESTING-------Re: \*\*Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The\*\* **Thanks JK****15th May 2018, 14:44** **#**[**52**](https://www.pprune.org/10147485-post52.html) **(**[**permalink**](https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.html#post10147485)**)** [wiggy](https://www.pprune.org/members/28194-wiggy)   Join Date: Feb 2001Location: Planet Earth (sometimes)Posts: 4,638  Quote:Originally Posted by **WeeWinkyWilly** *As I was saying in my earlier posts in this thread ....Depressurization plus unavailability of Flt Crew oxygen +ITCZ turbulence of flight through CB's in March = disrupted headings but static after spit-out from heavy cloud/turb. Flight to South and clear of ITCZ and climbing [autopilot off with weight redn due burn-off] plus unique characteristics of 777 flight control system = MH370DATES: This AD is effective* ***May 30, 2018****.* So just to check the theory here is that somehow with no autopilot or human intervention the aircraft not only cruise climbed but (again without autopilot or human intervention) also maintained a constant heading or track?Can you expand on what these “unique characteristics” of the 777 flight control system are? *Last edited by wiggy; 15th May 2018 at 14:55.*    **15th May 2018, 15:49** **#**[**53**](https://www.pprune.org/10147526-post53.html) **(**[**permalink**](https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-post10147526.html)**)** [WeeWinkyWilly](https://www.pprune.org/members/326058-weewinkywilly)   Join Date: Apr 2010Location: Lower SilesiaAge: 71Posts: 25  The 777 FCS is totally compensatory and has ultimate built-in redundancy with numerous fall-back, fail-safe and fault-defeating configurations. Even when the APU fuel supply line dries up and the RAT is deployed as sole pwr provider, the FCS is still true blue to its specs. That's what makes the fuel exhaustion death-dive shown in the risible 60 Minutes program so ludicrous. I could tell that Martin Dolan was in squirm mode. He's left the theory at the links above still sitting for inspection on ATSB's website (where it was posted many years ago now). After the 2nd engine flamed out and a descent set in, the aircraft would have ditched in a fairly optimal wings level clean attitude. The simulator flown by airlines is quite different in the reproduction of this FCS characteristic but Boeing's iron bird sim faithfully reproduces the flight characteristics. That's why "BOEING KNOWS" and the FAA is making sure that the oxygen fire fix is well and truly "in".. Auto-pilot OFF, a 777's uncommanded wing-drop is wing-leveled within micro-seconds - which leads to a very stable auto-pilot OFF heading stability (except when severe turbulence intervenes -as in ITCZ conditions or orographic turb (such as standing waves off of Sumatran Mountain ranges) - and all inherent stability bets are then off due to convective air-mass mix complexity). But upon regaining clear air, the ejectment heading is then maintained +/- around 5 degrees max for very long periods (i.e. longitudinally sinusoidal to a very very minor degree). Similarly the pitch phugoid damping is excellent and highly responsive to mild disruptions. With no pax or crew movement, the fuel burn-off just allows a continuous stable climb-rate of a few FPM. As the airplane ended up on a Southerly heading after the last ejectment, it was climbing into quite smooth cloud-free air to the south of the ITCZ and increasingly with a greatly reduced chance of bumbling into a CuNim and having the new base course heading change at all - compared to unpiloted ITCZ flight). Boeing is very much aware of the threat due to pilot incapacitation following crew supplementary oxygen fire and its typical trademark of rapid fuselage burn-through. NASA has had a dedicated section for many years (decades in fact) accumulating stats on nasty oxygen fires. No need to ask why. Read the links. The main blurb satisfactorily explains all the other "mystery" facets of MH370 as well. Second link is just an Exec Summary (and never kept updated).    ----- Original Message ----- **From:**"JOHN KING" <john.king19@comcast.net> **To:**<XXXXXXXX@iinet.net.au>, "Lyn S Romano" <xxxxxxx> **Cc:** **Sent:**Tue, 15 May 2018 11:25:15 -0400 (EDT) **Subject:**Re: VERY INTERESTING-------Re: \*\*Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The\*\*One of a number of ignition sources seen in my cataloging of 80 Fires, (others noted were electrically heated devices for anti - ice protection over doors, water systems, faulty relays, and my favorite - static port sensor heaters with about 7 ADs and some half dozen incidents at just Delta and Air Canada. From the two Canada Air fire events and TSB Final Reports, Boeing revealed some 60 some incidents and that a typical Boeing has at least 3 dozen - or more such heaters, depending on the configuration.Of course, here, increased oxygen levels speeded up the already flammable acoustic insulation blankets identified in both Douglas and Boeing warnings to all operators in the mid and late 90s. (The NTSB Docket contained a Chairman's 'Fire' Report saying the connection at the alternate static sensor port showed "molten metal", something which clearly accounts for the abnormality (increased pressures) for the altimeter, rate of climb and altitude at the precise "beginning of the timeline" in that NTSB Final Report).Too bad we didn't have this larger picture known to us back then; but then again the Douglas and Boeing warnings were 'industry eyes only' documents.John. On May 15, 2018 at 10:45 AM phoebus@iinet.net.au wrote:<https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.html> **15th May 2018, 14:37** **#**[**51**](https://www.pprune.org/10147477-post51.html) **(**[**permalink**](https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-post10147477.html)**)** [WeeWinkyWilly](https://www.pprune.org/members/326058-weewinkywilly)   Join Date: Apr 2010Location: Lower SilesiaAge: 71Posts: 25  As I was saying in my earlier posts in this thread and at [**http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2**](http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2)and at <http://tinyurl.com/gqpnwcn> AD 2018-09-12 **SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-200B, 747-300, and 747-400 series airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain low pressure oxygen flex-hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex-hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen. This AD also requires a general visual inspection of the low-pressure passenger oxygen system to ensure there is minimum clearance of the oxygen system components from adjacent structure and systems. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. This AD was prompted by reports of low-pressure flex-hoses of the**flightcrew oxygen system** that burned through due to inadvertent (??) electrical current from a short circuit.They forgot to add that the fuselage side also burnt through in ***all*** these instances (as noted at the links above, and at earlier post MH370 AD's for all Boeing types including 787's). Depressurization plus unavailability of Flt Crew oxygen +ITCZ turbulence of flight through CB's in March = disrupted headings but static after spit-out from heavy cloud/turb. Flight to South and clear of ITCZ and climbing [autopilot off with weight redn due burn-off] plus unique characteristics of 777 flight control system = MH370DATES: This AD is effective **May 30, 2018**. [https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.htm](https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.html)l

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| ----- Original Message ----- **From:**" **To:** **Cc:** **Sent:**Tue, 15 May 2018 10:24:27 -0400 **Subject:**Re: VERY INTERESTING-------Re: \*\*Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The\*\*Precisely why I highlighted it, even though I knew I didn’t have to. I knew you’d pick up on this one! On May 15, 2018, at 10:22 AM, XXXXXXX@iinet.net.au wrote:  SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-200B, 747-300, and 747-400 series airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain low pressure oxygen flex-hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex-hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen. This AD also requires a general visual inspection of the low-pressure passenger oxygen system to ensure there is minimum clearance of the oxygen system components from adjacent structure and systems.  We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.  This AD was prompted by reports of low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit.DATES: This AD is effective May 30, 2018.   |
| ----- Original Message ----- **From:**" **To:**<XXXXXXX@iinet.net.au> **Cc:** **Sent:**Tue, 15 May 2018 10:11:55 -0400 **Subject:**\*\*Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The\*\*  |
|  **From:** "U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Regulatory and Guidance Library" <usfaargl@service.govdelivery.com>**Date:** May 15, 2018 at 10:06:17 AM EDT**To:** **Subject:** **Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The****Reply-To:** usfaargl@service.govdelivery.com  Oxygen - Boeing Company^ The

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| 2018-09-12 - Large Airplane/Boeing Company, The/747-200B Series2018-09-12 - Large Airplane/Boeing Company, The/747-300 Series2018-09-12 - Large Airplane/Boeing Company, The/747-400 Series You are subscribed to the FAA's GovDelivery service for Airworthiness Directives and Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins, which are also posted in our Regulatory and Guidance Library (RGL) at [http://rgl.faa.gov](http://links.govdelivery.com/track?type=click&enid=ZWFzPTEmbXNpZD0mYXVpZD0mbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTgwNTE1Ljg5NzY0MDIxJm1lc3NhZ2VpZD1NREItUFJELUJVTC0yMDE4MDUxNS44OTc2NDAyMSZkYXRhYmFzZWlkPTEwMDEmc2VyaWFsPTE3MDA4NjEyJmVtYWlsaWQ9cm9zZWJ1c2hAYmVzdHdlYi5uZXQmdXNlcmlkPXJvc2VidXNoQGJlc3R3ZWIubmV0JnRhcmdldGlkPSZmbD0mZXh0cmE9TXVsdGl2YXJpYXRlSWQ9JiYm&&&100&&&http://rgl.faa.gov/)This service is provided at no charge. You can update your subscription information at any time on your [User Profile Page](http://links.govdelivery.com/track?type=click&enid=ZWFzPTEmbXNpZD0mYXVpZD0mbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTgwNTE1Ljg5NzY0MDIxJm1lc3NhZ2VpZD1NREItUFJELUJVTC0yMDE4MDUxNS44OTc2NDAyMSZkYXRhYmFzZWlkPTEwMDEmc2VyaWFsPTE3MDA4NjEyJmVtYWlsaWQ9cm9zZWJ1c2hAYmVzdHdlYi5uZXQmdXNlcmlkPXJvc2VidXNoQGJlc3R3ZWIubmV0JnRhcmdldGlkPSZmbD0mZXh0cmE9TXVsdGl2YXJpYXRlSWQ9JiYm&&&101&&&https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USFAARGL/subscriber/edit?preferences=true#tab1). If you have any questions about this service, please email us at rgl@faa.gov

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|   | <https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.html>Reply With QuoteQuick reply to this message**Unread15th May 2018, 14:37** **#**[**51**](https://www.pprune.org/10147477-post51.html) **(**[**permalink**](https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-post10147477.html)**)** [WeeWinkyWilly](https://www.pprune.org/members/326058-weewinkywilly)   Join Date: Apr 2010Location: Lower SilesiaAge: 71Posts: 25  As I was saying in my earlier posts in this thread and at [**http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2**](http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2)and at <http://tinyurl.com/gqpnwcn> AD 2018-09-12 **SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-200B, 747-300, and 747-400 series airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain low pressure oxygen flex-hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex-hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen. This AD also requires a general visual inspection of the low-pressure passenger oxygen system to ensure there is minimum clearance of the oxygen system components from adjacent structure and systems. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. This AD was prompted by reports of low-pressure flex-hoses of the **flightcrew oxygen system** that burned through due to inadvertent (??) electrical current from a short circuit.They forgot to add that the fuselage side also burnt through in ***all*** these instances (as noted at the links above, and at earlier post MH370 AD's for all Boeing types including 787's). Depressurization plus unavailability of Flt Crew oxygen +ITCZ turbulence of flight through CB's in March = disrupted headings but static after spit-out from heavy cloud/turb. Flight to South and clear of ITCZ and climbing [autopilot off with weight redn due burn-off] plus unique characteristics of 777 flight control system = MH370DATES: This AD is effective **May 30, 2018**. You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0362[https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.htm](https://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/607936-mh370-search-progress-reporting-not-3.html)l     |
|   | SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  for AD 2018-09-12 *[released 15 May 2018]***Discussion** This AD was prompted by reports of low-pressure oxygen flex-hoses in the continuously pressurized flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit. Conductive oxygen hoses in the flight deck were addressed previously in AD 2010-1605, Amendment 39-16382 (75 FR 47208, August 5, 2010) (“AD 2010-16-05”). The gaseous passenger oxygen system equipped with therapeutic oxygen is not continuously pressurized and must be activated by the flightcrew. Exposure to electrical faults, such as unintended short circuits, can result in localized electrical heating of the low-pressure oxygen flex-hoses. This condition, if not corrected, could result in electrical current passing through the low-pressure oxygen flex-hoses, which can cause flex-hoses to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the passenger cabin. ***Other Relevant Rulemaking*** We issued AD 2010-16-05 for certain The Boeing Company Model 747 airplanes. AD 2010-1605 was prompted by reports of low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit in the audio select panel. AD 201016-05 requires inspecting to verify the part number of the low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system installed under the oxygen mask stowage boxes in the flight deck, and replacing the flex-hose with a new non-conductive low-pressure flex-hose if necessary. We issued AD 2010-16-05 to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system to melt or burn, causing oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire. Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51 We reviewed **Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-35-2134, dated November 22, 2017**. The service information describes procedures for replacing certain low-pressure oxygen flex-hose assemblies with non-conductive flex-hose assemblies at multiple locations and a general visual inspection to ensure the oxygen system components have minimum clearance from adjacent structure and systems. This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section. **FAA's Determination** We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. **AD Requirements** This AD requires accomplishment of the actions identified as “RC” (required for compliance) in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-35-2134, dated November 22, 2017, described previously, except as discussed under “Differences Between this AD and the Service Information,” and except for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this AD. For information on the procedures and compliance times, see this service information at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0362. Differences Between This AD and the Service Information Where the Condition column of Table 3 in paragraph 1.E., “Compliance,” of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-35-2134, dated November 22, 2017, specifies “all airplanes,” for this AD, the Condition column of Table 3 is “airplanes on which one or more hose assemblies were replaced or disconnected.” As specified in step 3.B.12 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-35-2134, dated November 22, 2017, the oxygen system low pressure leak test and applicable corrective actions are only accomplished if one or more hose assemblies were replaced or disconnected. FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date There are currently no domestic operators of this product. Therefore, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days. Comments Invited This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this final rule. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number FAA-2018-0362 and Product Identifier 2018-NM020-AD at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this final rule. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this final rule because of those comments. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this final rule.   |