MH370 - Non-Speculative (and based on Precedents and Reported Circumstance)

Having watched CNN's program "the Vanishing", a speculative, factual and interpretive review of MH370's fate, I am struck moreso by the historical facts that are not being considered - and the dearth of any real attempts to explain quite explicable events. The logical "non-nefarious" explanation for MH370 has been available and widely disseminated by me in an opinion piece of April 2014 (1.). The reason why it's not popular with Boeing or MAS will become evident. The first port of call whenever there's a non-obvious aircraft accident is to review any precedents that might be directly relevant. The most obvious one that could lead to pilot incapacitation, and continued protracted flight of a partially disabled aircraft, is the fire that destroyed the Egyptair 777 SU-GBP "Nefertiti" on the tarmac at Cairo airport on 29 July 2011. It was a sudden oxygen flash-fire caused by the electrically conductive helical anti-kink wire running internally through the copilot's low pressure oxygen hose. It shorted out (Report:  http://tinyurl.com/lxg34rl ). The Egyptian copilot necessarily vacated the cockpit immediately the fire broke out, under Captain's orders to call the fire service. The captain, unsurprisingly for an oxygen-fed fire, was unable to have any effect at all on the blowtorch fire with a hand-held fire extinguisher and vacated the flight-deck to supervise pax evacuation. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Noteworthy was the fact that the oxygen blowtorch effect at the copilot's side-console mounted regulator very quickly ate its way through the side of the aircraft below the copilot's side-window. No-one was injured. Very few bothered to extrapolate the accident into just how intensely fraught it might prove to be in an airborne circumstance. i.e an oxygen flash fire being lethal enough without even considering the sudden depressurization of a holed fuselage and a lack of pilot's oxygen - both pilots being reliant upon the same (now compromised and unavailable) oxygen supply system - and the time of useful consciousness without supplemental oxygen being measured in mere seconds at above 30,000 feet altitude. Factor in the isolation of an impenetrable locked cockpit door and the need for an instantaneous pilot emergency descent response to an aircraft depressurization, and you've created a crematorium up front - and a morgue down the back. On the other side of that cockpit door there would be little to convey the urgency of the happenings in the cockpit - just a standard rubber jungle of dropdown masks and the subtle incapacitation of hypoxia. After 15 minutes, if the aircraft hasn't descended to a life-supportive altitude (18,000ft and below), the dropdown masks' oxygen supplies would be exhausted and passengers would die en masse. Flight attendants' consciousness would last much longer, courtesy of their portable oxygen bottles. However it's not a given that they would have been able to access the flight-deck.... or would have tried, considering that their intercom was likely dead and their responsibilities were primarily to the distressed and dying pax.

Limitations and Characteristics of an Airborne Oxygen Flare Fire

Don’t be misled by the SU-GBP imagery (in the Egyptian report) of the fire’s effect aft of the flight-deck door. Because the firemen were concentrating upon the evacuation of a full load of pax, the fire itself didn’t get their full attention and it soon grabbed hold and was propagated aft through the crown areas (similar to the SR-111 fire spread but in the other direction due to the recirc fans being turned off by the checklist[SR-111] – but rather through them being left ON). The Egyptian firemen were not to know that it was an oxygen fire and that the only way to fight it was to turn off the oxygen at source.

Aircon is traditionally two packs to the larger volume of the cabin and only half of one pack to the flight-deck. In other words, the flight-deck airborne and in normal circumstances shares its recirc air-supply with the cabin. On the ground the majority of APU pack/ or ground-cart air would go to the cabin. But it matters not at all because the flight-deck door would be open anyway, particularly as the Egyptair captain soon sent the copilot aft and then attempted to fight the fire himself with a handheld fire-ext, keeping the open flight-deck door as his escape route.. So, to summarize, on the ground there was nothing to stop the unfought fire spreading aft of the open flight-deck door to the fwd galley….. either through the door or via the crown-spaces above that door.

However airborne at height, the fire would have been initially isolated to a point-source, possibly giving the affected pilot time to remove himself from his seat. But you cannot “fight” an oxygen fire – you have to isolate the oxygen flow. Perhaps that’s a point worth making (an auto-shut-off valve that’s motivated by volume outpour excesses). However once the fire has quickly destroyed a few square centimetres around its point source, like an acid eating away, you then have a gush-dump of unimpeded outflow superimposed upon an already oxygen-enriched  flight-deck environment. That’s essentially unsurvivable for anyone trapped that side of the flight-deck door. So what's being said here is that once that fire ignited, the pilots had around 30 to 90 seconds before their lungs were seared (i.e. before they would’ve been cooked in the flash-over of an oxygen dump as the last flow-limiter was burnt away). In that period they wound in the autopilot’s turn-back and possibly attempted to fight that fire. Quite a pointless gesture, probably made through not realizing that it was an oxygen supported inferno. But I’d guess that the point-source blowtorch would’ve already had ample time to weaken the hull at that side-console location, being assisted by the pressurization’s differential pressure, - and then as the hull ruptured, the aural pressurization alarm sounded. If not already masks ON at that point, the pressurization alarm gives rise to just one fluid rote pilot reaction – masks ON, kill the autopilot and dump the nose, accelerating to emergency descent speed (normally +50 knots of IAS, at which point you deploy the speedbrakes and close the power-levers). That’s the point at which the pilots would’ve reached their time of useful consciousness without supplementary oxygen – and also the point at which the cabin’s rubber jungle of masks appeared. The fire’s been going for around 30 to 90 seconds and the pilots have now effectively expired. But no-one aft of the locked flight-deck door would have a clue as to what’s happened in the cockpit.

What happened to the fire at the time of depressurization? The oxygen-enriched atmosphere on the flight-deck would’ve instantly become the cold oxygen-depleted air of the thin ambient atmosphere at 35,000ft. Fire would’ve been totally quenched and any residual smoulder soon dampened. Damage would be visually minimal but many plastic switches, their surrounds, circuit breakers, keypads and screens would’ve been affected by the flash-over, killing some systems. Meanwhile back in the cabin, the flight attendants are doing their drill, assuming that the pilots have it all under control, i.e. they are seeing to the distressed passengers, confident that the steep nose-down attitude is what should be expected. However once they felt the g force of the pitch-up into a steep climb, they’d possibly be wondering about that - but perhaps assuming that the rubber jungle had been deployed by accident and that the cabin air would again soon be breathable – and that the zoom back to their cruise altitude was due to a pilot abandonment of the emergency descent. But how would they now know that the air was breathable (or not)? They are all on walk-around bottles and the pax are evidently only a couple of minutes into their mask’s canister-supplied 10 minutes worth. Quite unknown to them is the totality of what’s transpired the other side of that door. They’d be awaiting an announcement. Over the next 8 minutes the mask-wearing flight attendants have little chance to co-consult with each other. Some may have had their doubts that it was all going according to Hoyle, but were individually afraid of being anything other than the calming F/A , each one  individually attending to many distressed persons. At this point the inevitable  fate of all pax on board is to quietly succumb. The F/A’s bottles, and any spares, would soon be being shared with those pax who are evidently in trouble with their respiration as their cannisters emptied. Many if not most Chinese are smokers. My guess is that 20 minutes after the zoom climb, stall and self-recovery, all aboard would’ve been dead or close to it. In the interim,  one or more Flight attendants may have attempted to call the flight-deck but - with nil reply, - what were they to do or assume? I’d suggest that they just got on with their duties as the aircraft seemed to be now back in straight and level flight. Nobody aft of the flight-deck door on MAS is taught to use their initiative and question or query the pilots’ status. The assumption is always to be that the pilots have everything under control.

In the last few minutes of walk-round bottle life, who’s to know if some brave soul unlocked the flight-deck door or tried to? If he/she had done so, they’d have found something quite a bit less devastated  than the SU-GBP cockpit photo. There’d be some visual evidence of fire but I’d suggest that their distraction (until the end of their oxygen supply) would be an attempted resuscitation of one or both pilots. The pilots would have masks on and show some burns but the main evidence of their deaths would be hidden (seared lungs, eyes tight-shut in their full-face masks and a hypoxic death). If the Flight attendants found the pilots wearing their oxygen masks, would they be likely to remove them and attempt to revive them with a portable oxygen bottle? Most probably not. Imagine the average F/A’s priorities? i.e.  “We must resuscitate the pilots or we are doomed”. But how would they ever go about it? Mouth to mouth? Hardly.

 Making a phone-call, even if they knew how to locate and utilize the sat-phone and this was fire-unaffected? Hardly likely. Not sure whether the sat-phones are handset or headset operated (or whether they are portable or compartment-stowed). If they were on the pilot’s side consoles, they were likely cooked. If any flight attendants made it into the flight-deck they'd have been powerless to achieve anything. Even if radios were functional, the microphones were now switched through to the oxygen facemasks. Headset mikes, if any were evident, were probably switched inoperative.

You just cannot factor out perplexion, distraction and panic in these time-locked scenarios that are outside a rear-end crewmembers' experience.. It’s certainly a picture that neither Boeing or MAS wants painted.

Following the Egyptian Report upon the cause of the Nefertiti oxygen-fed fire at Cairo, Boeing issued a Service Bulletin recommending an "inspect and repair as necessary" on the

767 fire was in the Supernumerary compartment

 777 pilot's low pressure oxygen hoses. The FAA backed this up with an FAA Airworthiness Directive (mandatory only for US-certificated airplanes). If MAS had elected to abide this Boeing/FAA guidance, they would have signed off on that AD no later than the implementation date that was two weeks prior to the disappearance of MH370. Did this happen? Prove it did - or conversely, prove that it didn't. Don't expect MAS to divulge the true facts on this lynch-pin question. It's not unusual for a low-priority "fix" to be deferred by another country's airline, on local authority, until the next major scheduled servicing. It's far more common than anyone would think. Authority for this sort of delegated deferment is often well down the line (at deputy maint mgr level usually). To be fair, it can also be due to parts availability or airframe requirements to meet schedules. But notwithstanding all that, it's sufficient to note that Boeing and the FAA had been criticised in the NTSB's 2009 report on another much earlier Jumbo jet loss (a 767 at San Francisco in 2008) in which it had been found that the helical coil in the 3rd cockpit seat's oxygen supply line had shorted out, causing the disastrous fire - see next section. This electrically conductive helical coil in the pilots vital flight deck oxygen low pressure hoses has since proven to be commonplace ubiquitous across many airliner models....even the 787.

 767 Report: see report: NTSB AAR-09/04/SUM at  http://tinyurl.com/qjk6maa

The 767 fire was in the regulator adjacent to the 3rd supernumerary seat

1.    28 Jun 2008. A Boeing 767 (reg: N799AX) burnt fiercely on the tarmac at San Francisco following an electrically-initiated oxygen hose fire on the flight deck. The fire quickly

Oxygen Fire in 767 N799AX (aftermath)

 burnt through the fuselage above the regulator (cockpit crown).

NTSB Report (PROBABLE CAUSE): "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the design of the supplemental oxygen system hoses and the lack of positive separation between electrical wiring and electrically conductive oxygen system components. The lack of positive separation allowed a short circuit to breach a combustible oxygen hose, release oxygen, and initiate a fire in the supernumerary compartment that rapidly spread to other areas. Contributing to this accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to require the installation of nonconductive oxygen hoses after the safety issue concerning conductive hoses was initially identified by Boeing." (http://tinyurl.com/qbopru2   ). The manufacturer of the PVC flexible oxygen hoses installed a stainless steel coil spring in the hoses, as shown in the report linked below, to prevent bends from kinking and collapsing the hose and thus disrupting the oxygen supply. The stainless steel helical coil was loosely attached to the aluminum fittings at each hose end, making the hoses electrically conductive.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20080628-0

http://asndata.aviation-safety.net/reports/US/20080628-0_B762_N799AX.pdf

 Ground Fire Aboard Cargo Airplane ABX Air Flight 1611 Boeing 767-200, N799AX San Francisco, California June 28, 2008 (NTSB AAR-09/04/SUM)

2.   RAAF P3B Orion A9-300 imagery is at:  http://www.adf-gallery.com.au/gallery/Orion-A9-300a  RAAF P3 Orion of 92 Wing destroyed in an Oxygen fire at RAAF Edinburgh South Australia In this accident, 92 Wing maint personnel mistakenly disconnected an oxygen line under pressure in the presence of a lubricant and metal filings, resulting in classic spontaneous combustion and an oxygen-fed flash fire that destroyed the airplane on the ramp at RAAF Edinburgh South Australia.. (Defence Report is at: http://tinyurl.com/opyvmoz ) Quote from the Report on A9-300: "Under the prevailing conditions a jet of oxygen, at a temperature high enough to blow the relief valve, formed an "oxygen lance" which rapidly cut through the cylinder. The remaining oxygen cylinder pressure was sufficient to cause the cylinder to be propelled through the side wall of the aircraft."   If this sounds familiar, you may recall that QANTAS 747 Flight QF30 lost an oxygen cylinder through the hull of a 747 cargo bay in similar circumstances (but airborne approaching Manila) a few years back. (see coverage and imagery below)

Qantas Flight 30 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_30 Qantas Flight 30 (QF30, QFA30) was a Qantas Boeing 747-438, construction ... The flight was interrupted when an oxygen tank exploded causing a fuselage ... ‎In-flight accident - ‎Investigation - ‎Repairs - ‎IFALPA ATSB investigation highlights QF30 oxygen bottle explosion ... australianaviation.com.au/.../atsb-investigation-highlights-qf30-oxygen-b... Nov 22, 2010 - ... of the explosion of an oxygen bottle on a Qantas Boeing 747-400 in ... any other related instances of aviation oxygen cylinder rupture (civil or ... Images for QANTAS Oxygen tank explosionReport images         More images for QANTAS Oxygen tank explosion [PDF]PDF: 3.1MB - Australian Transport Safety Bureau www.atsb.gov.au/media/3154108/jan-feb11.pdf Martin Dolan. Chief Commissioner. The Australian Aviation Saf. The rupture of an oxygen cylinder on board a Qantas Boeing 747 was a unique event and highly. Valve in oxygen cylinder the culprit in 747 explosion www.smh.com.au/.../valve-in-oxygen-cylinder-the-culprit-in-747-explosio... Jul 29, 2008 - A valve from an oxygen cylinder blasted a hole at least 20 centimetres in diameter in the floor of the passenger cabin of the Qantas 747 stricken ... Qantas oxygen cylinder explosion | QF 30 oxygen cylinder ... www.theaustralian.com.au/news/gallery-e6frg6n6-1225958326726?page... Qantas flight 30 from London to Melbourne was forced to land in Manila when an oxygen cylinder exploded mid-air. Qantas 747 Has Rapid Decompression near Manila 25 July ... www.airsafe.com/plane-crash/qantas-flight-30-747-manila.htm Area damaged by an exploding oxygen cylinder in a Qantas 747-400 ... The second interim report did not identify the cause of the cylinder explosion, but ... Episode 6: John Bartels & QF30 : Flight Podcast www.flightpodcast.com/episode-6-john-bartels-qantas-qf30 Apr 17, 2011 - Qantas Flight 30 (QF30) was a Qantas Boeing 747-438 (construction ... The flight was interrupted when an oxygen tank exploded causing a ... Jetspotter.com • View topic - qantas oxygen tank explosion report ... www.jetspotter.com › ... › Aviation Forums › General Discussion Nov 17, 2009 - 2 posts - ‎2 authors Qantas oxygen cylinder blast mys. The oxygen bottle's explosion ripped a huge hole in the side of a Qantas Boeing 747. The oxygen bottle's ... AM - Oxygen cylinder may have caused QANTAS explosion www.abc.net.au/am/content/2008/s2315932.htm Jul 28, 2008 - Aircraft experts say its plausible that an exploding oxygen cylinder forced a QANTAS 747 to make an emergency landing in Manila last Friday ...

 

 An "Owed to Oxygen"

One common denominator identified in the Boeing accidents is that the oxygen regulators and reading lights are in quite close juxtaposition. In the SU-GBP accident, the APU had just been started for additional cabin cooling and ventilation when the flash-fire broke out. The 767 report comments upon the fact that reading lights get very hot, however it's more likely that the bus feeding the reading lights was brought on-line by the APU start, providing the electrical power for the short. i.e. Ground power units may not power systems busses identically. However interestingly, the 2008 767 accident report also comments upon the electrically conductive oxy-hose-internal anti-kink stiffener wire and berates the FAA for not addressing this previously identified anomaly. Reading lights are universally well-known for being "left on" - unnoticed in daylight (and, as a result getting super-hot). In the 767 accident the crew had just initiated their "mask's preflight flow-check".

Airborne, when would a copilot reach for his mask in a non-urgent situation? Answer: At cruising altitude, perhaps when the captain announces that he's going on a toilet-break, leaving the copilot on his lonesome on the other side of a locked door. This may have been the scenario in MH370. Shortly after reaching top of climb, and having been handed off to another ATC agency and settled in the cruise... this would be the point at which most captains would elect to head aft on a toilet break.

Boeing 747 N571UP (from the accident report)

"4. The uncontained cargo fire directly affected the independent critical systems necessary for crew survivability. Heat from the fire exposed the supplementary oxygen system to extreme thermal loading, sufficient to generate a failure. This resulted in the oxygen supply disruption leading to the abrupt failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply and the incapacitation of the captain."

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20100903-0

There are potentially others (i.e. oxygen initiated fires) (e.g. 5V-TAG - a B707 on 21 Sep 2000 )  wherein the source of fire was never determined due to the degree of disruption.

(B707 AP-AWZ on 26 Nov 1979) "A second possibility is an electrical fire, but the rapid extension of the fire was considered difficult to explain because of the electrical circuit protection devices of the Boeing 707. Sabotage was considered as another possibility, but no evidence of use of an incendiary device was found." Oxygen fires can be sneaky and difficult to uncover as having been causative. The oxygen flash fire (as a source or trigger) has become an "unmentionable" in reports where it cannot be positively implicated. Wiring fires can often be proven by dint of beads left by arcing, however oxygen-initiated fires are quite often misinterpreted as oxygen-fuelled or -fed fires. Airborne oxygen flash fires are in fact quite unique in that they are usually point-sourced, create a blowtorch hull-rupturing at source (see SU-GBP and N799AX imagery) and can end abruptly once the flow-source to the supply bottles is interdicted by that fire. Any conflagrational follow-on from a cockpit fire at height is quickly squelched by the hull-rupture and the oxygen rich atmosphere on the closed flight-deck instantly giving way to a quite anoxic depressurized atmosphere in which any residual smouldering is soon extinguished. What we must consider is the transient effect of an oxygen flash-fire upon the modern predominantly plastic push-button and plastic display cockpit of the modern jetliner. How might these systems be affected and would continued flight be possible?

During the mid to late 80's there was a gradual digital-age transition from metallic flip-and -toggle switches to the nowadays plastic push-button era on the modern flight-deck. Logical and functional, yes... but not impervious to the searing temperatures of a short duration oxygen flash fire. You could argue that it is likely that the pilots, behind their secure cockpit door, would have suffered seared lungs and eye damage and would have been unable to escape the fire or able to get any succour from their oxygen masks - even if they'd been able to don them. So would they have been able to do anything at all when (or if) an oxygen flash fire had broken out? It may of course depend on whether theMH370 captain was still seated or proceeding aft and thus essentially clear. From the timings and pilot actions cited in the SU-GBP and N799AX accident reports, we are told that the SU-GBP captain attempted to fight the fire. Might we assume that the MH370 captain or copilot may have had time (prior to hull-rupture) to wind in a left-hand (shortest way) autopilot turnback towards Pulau  Langkawi. We are further told of a 15 second delay between aural indications of a malfunction and visible fire in the 767 incident. It might also be safely assumed that it would be instinctive, even for an injured pilot, to disconnect the autopilot and "stuff the nose down" into an emergency descent once the depressurization klaxon sounded. However, having said that, that's approximately when all the "happy ever after" potential outcomes would have ceased to exist. Due to injury or passing out due to lack of oxygen, pilot input may have been limited to disconnecting the autopilot and then forcibly lowering the pitch attitude via his yoke. However, for this to have worked and eventually achieve, despite the pilot's insensibility,  a lower life-supporting altitude,  the pilot would have also have had to trim decisively nose-down. Because of being accustomed to auto-trim, many modern day pilots neglect, once in extremis, to simultaneously use the manual trim-wheel (or manually activated electric trim) in order to trim into a sustained descent attitude. This was found to have been the case with the air-test A320 lost off Perpignan and in the Air France A330 crash (AF447). So what was the net effect of the MH370 pilot passing out before accelerating to emergency descent speed and retarding the power levers, extending the speedbrakes or trimming nose-down? As his urgently held nose-down input on his yoke ceased, there would have been a pitch-up into a stall due to the out-of-trim state, a recovery and then an eventual resumption of stable powered flight - all courtesy of the 777's somewhat unique Active Flight Control System (AFCS).

But meanwhile, what of the aircraft systems and the much cited puzzling loss of transponder, ACARS, comms etc? When an oxygen flash fire erupts, it has a very short and finite life, particularly at cruise-height when it is soon abruptly squelched by the loss of an oxygen-enriched atmosphere - due to hull rupture. We could (fancifully) couple this shortish duration fire to what the oil-rig worker saw. What he reported has been widely poo-poo'd as unlikely, particularly in light of MH370's continued flight. But it rings true for an oxygen flash-fire. What might happen to the modern plastic flight deck when subjected to such a suddenly super-heated environment - followed by the intense cold of depressurization? Plastic switches may actuate or jam due to dissimilar melting points in the plastics of switches and switch surrounds, touch screens may actuate and lose function, other screens may sag or melt, circuits may actuate, systems may fail or fail-safe, circuit-breakers may trip. Some systems might fail temporarily and then reset due to redundancy kick-in. The inherent vulnerability to a flash fire of a plastic-switched and -screened cockpit is quite different to the metal flip-and-toggle switched cockpits of yesteryear. Thus might many systems have failed and explain why there was a coincident course reversal and inerting of many comms related functions. The suddenness and surprise of an oxygen flash fire easily explains why pilot reporting would've been at least nil priority and at worst, impossible. This unique fire scenario is nothing like the classic initiating "dark brown smell" of the usual incipient "fire in the cockpit scenario". It just happens and at most, from NTSB testing, will give a 5 second loud hiss and a pop - as the hose internal fire erupts into the cockpit atmosphere.

ITCZ seasonal movement https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d7/ITCZ_january-july.png

If the pilot had quickly wound in a turnback heading upon the fire breaking out and the system had achieved a standard rate LH turn through (about) 140 degrees (i.e. a rough roll-out heading for the nearest available suitable airfield (Pulau Langkawi or an airfield on the East Coast of the Malayan Peninsular south of Kuantan), the aircraft would have rolled out Westbound just prior to any blowtorch-induced hull rupture and depressurization alarm (i.e. it takes around that long for an oxy blowtorch on the side-console to pierce the hull). Upon then hearing the unique depressurization alarm, the surviving pilot may have disconnected the autopilot and commenced his instinctive entry into an emergency descent. As described above, once the pilot(s) had succumbed to injury or hypoxia, the autopilot-off 9M-MRO would have pitched up, climbed a few thousand feet and stalled, being thereafter in the hands of the Active Flight Control System (AFCS), . This system is very very redundant and is unique in that it will instantly counter a gust-induced wing-drop by immediately "picking up" the dropped wing. The resultant heading constancy and lack of meander left and right of course is quite remarkable for its longer term stability. Likewise, the phugoid dampening abilities of the AFCS would have rapidly recovered from any pitch-up stall and thereafter enabled a pitch-trim dictated stable attitude in pitch. This pitch-trimmed attitude would've been adequately supported by whatever high power (at its initial cruise weight) had been set at level-off, prior to the fire.

 As gross weight slowly reduced due to fuel burn-off, the aircraft would have gradually continued a climb in a steady Thrust/Drag/Weight state of equilibrium, considerably increasing its potential (air nautical miles per pound) range to fuel exhaustion.

But what of the later "mystical" turns prior to its lengthy southbound final leg? The ITCZ easily explains that. The InterTropic Convergence Zone is centered North of the Equator at that time of the year and its prototypical thunderheads extend to well above 50,000 feet. The pilotless MH370 would have blundered into any number of these and been quickly spat out on different headings before the AFCS prevailed, recovered from the upset and restored a stable flight regime. Apparently the final "spit-out" was onto a southerly heading. The higher MH370 climbed due to fuel burn-off and the further south it tracked, the less likely it was to run into any further thunderheads. Once south of the ITCZ and the Equator, the MH370 Ghost Flight would have been well above and clear of thunderstorms vertically and in eerily smooth air, with almost nil tracking meander. The only asymmetry may have been due to its hull damage and a discharge of pressurization air from that hull-rupture hole.

As inferred above, the constant climb technique of fuel burn-off permitting a continuous climb to an ever greater altitude would have optimized MH370's achievable range beyond that calculated by reference to the 777 manual - and moreover, by up to 4% (which is a considerable additional mileage over a maximum range to fuel exhaustion). This brings into question the southern extents of the search areas. Once one engine had flamed out, MH370 may have lost its directionality until such time as the second engine died and then, with the RAT deployed and powering essential systems, the residual unpowered pitch trim-state should have supported a low-speed steady-state wings-level glide down to a more or less optimized attitude for a wings-level splash-down on the ocean's surface. The flaperon found on Reunion Island had damage along its trailing edge consistent with a nose-high touchdown and was likely torn off by the starboard engine pylon peeling off aft - as it took its gulping drink of seawater. The diversion left or right of track induced by the fuel exhaustion flame-out of the first engine is likely to have been less than 25 miles. Fuel supply system equalization of modern jets tends to assure that a double flameout fuel exhaustion event will occur within an overall period of 5 to 8 minutes. If the "ditching" attitude was fairly benign as described, it is likely that the MH370 hull and wings (and contents) remained in place and intact.... explaining the lack of flotsam and jetsam and bodies. Engines may have detached however and be located quite separate from the eventual resting place of the drifting (and highly flotational) hull. It's not unlikely that the two engines could be located separately by the bottom-mappers and be dismissed from further inspection as overboarded freight containers.

Coincident with the ATC hand-off to Vietnam's ATC and immediately prior to 9M-MRO's reversal of course, there was an abrupt cascade of events that overwhelmed the MH370 pilots - both physically and with the power of surprise. Notwithstanding the pain and the rapidly deteriorating environmentals, one of the pilots survived long enough to wind in a course reversal towards Pulau Langkawi or Kuantan - and then entered an emergency descent once the hull was ruptured by the oxygen blowtorch, causing the depressurization aural alarm to sound off. It's entirely possible that the pilot donned his oxygen mask during the turn or prior to commencing an emergency descent. Due to the very limited time of useful consciousness above 30,000ft, the pilot would have passed out due to the lack of available oxygen or the ingested smoke.... permitting the aircraft to zoom back up to height. This failure to descend (to an altitude with breathable air) sealed the fate of all aboard. It's unlikely that rear-end crew-members were aware of any cockpit problem, and had only noted that pax oxy masks had dropped down. Flight attendants would have assumed an emergency descent was then on the cards and been reluctant to contact or distract the pilots. As the aircraft entered a descent, their reassurance of a standard procedure being underway would have been shattered by the subsequent climb. Momentarily non-plussed by this, they'd have then suddenly been faced with panic-stricken passengers who were passing out en masse within around 10 minutes (due expiry of their limited emergency oxygen). Well before MH370 had become "feet dry" above the Malay Peninsula, all aboard would have expired. The ghost flight was then unpiloted with the autopilot OFF and at the whimsy of the meteorological phenomena it was now not able to avoid - in the seasonal geographic middle of the Intertropic Convergence Zone (ITCZ). Having flown into a number of CumuloNimbus cloud-tops (aka Thunderheads) and been spat out of the turbulence on various headings, its last exit heading was southerly. This took MH370 south of the Equator and thus well clear of the ITCZ's latitudinally limited classic convective activity. Due to fuel burn-off and smooth air, the aircraft would have climbed constantly until fuel exhaustion. The collective mindset seems unable to comprehend the effect of an oxygen flare fire upon a flight-deck full of plastic switches, pushbuttons, screens and thermally activated circuit-breakers. They've continued to disregard the oil-rig worker's sighting and indulged in fanciful theories about unlawful interference.... based upon the easily explained mystical mid-course heading changes. The solution (as outlined) is actually so simple that it perversely leads one towards speculation that the only nefarious conspiracy is amongst those who have linked the adequate precedent accidents to MH370 - and who wish to submerge that relationship.

All the various rehashes, including CNN's "Vanish", delve into (and are replete with) finite but inconsequential detail. Any broadbrush view of exactly what happened (and why) can deduce a likely scenario and eliminate most (if not all) others. Some additional clues, such as the oil-rig worker's sighting, can prove useful when viewed against the likely explanation (and unique features) of an oxygen flash-fire. The dead giveaways in most accidents are the unique to type (or aircraft class) precedents. These stand out in the MH370 saga as paramount concerns that were never held as real concerns by the responsible parties (nor addressed properly), prior to MH370 (but were "fixed" later with the benefit of secretive hindsights). So if one was to venture that there'd been a cover-up you'd have to also ask: "...but where's the proof?". More correctly, you could say that there has been a policy of non-disclosure in knowledgeable quarters, a rush to quietly fix the discrepancy, sage silence from the US regulator and a simultaneous mischievous misdirection (by all of these authorities) to be acquiescent in allowing the blame to be laid on nameless but nefarious "third parties".

Ques:  One thing: do you really think it is plausible the 'burning jet' seen by that oil-rig worker was MH370? I thought that its trajectory was way outside the MAS plane's track?

Answer:   On the question of the oil-rig worker’s sighting  feasibility, I haven’t done any analysis in-depth on that. Once you read what’s below here, you may or may not agree that it’s a case of “how long is a piece of string”?

However there is a credible case to be made. Oxygen flare fires tend to be rather bright against the night sky  (particularly if they are “undercast” (i.e. below an overcast of cloud layer or inside cloud) i.e. think the appearance of sheet lightning being lightning seen through an embracing cloud – it is that much more attention-getting). Also the flare tends to be attention-getting (in comparison with an established fire of a more-or-less static brilliance). Meteor sightings have been proven to have been impossibly distant for visual sighting, yet arriving particles as small as a tiny pebble tend to generate brilliant trails seen over great distances. It’s a matter of varying contrast. You can clearly see a rising moon over a huge distance whilst it’s still low on the horizon, so I’d tend to favour the premise that something momentarily incandescent will be viewable at a great range, mostly because of the nature of its sudden emergence, as well as the distinct instantaneous contrast on a dark night.

If you put a strobe light alongside a light of the same number of “lumens”, at a great distance (but separated laterally), whilst you would easily see the strobe, you’d never notice the same intensity static light at the same range, but in a slightly different direction. That’s why a strobe light is used on aircraft nowadays - to enhance its visibility. It is so effective for visual acquisition at great ranges and very low power. Its “pulse” waxes and wanes and thus “commands” attention due to easy visual acquisition. The sudden pulse of an oxygen flare fire outbreak, in an “empty visual field”, would be viewable over hundreds of kms at night IMHO. i.e. the flare event itself overcomes empty visual field myopia and provides a point of focus…. thus greatly increasing visibility ranges.

See:

http://tinyurl.com/ngnaa6p

In case you’re not familiar with the phenomenon of "empty visual field myopia"……

Empty field myopia (Empty space myopia) - a condition in which the eyes, having nothing specific within the available visual field upon which to focus, focus automatically at a range of the order of a few metres ahead. Detection of objects outside this restricted field of view is delayed and if an object of interest does enter the restricted field of vision, the determination of its size or range would be problematic.

Description

The normal function of the eye lens is to physically focus light from the object on the retina. To do this, the eye must be stimulated by an image. Empty field myopia manifests itself when the human eye is in a passive state of focal point adjustment, i.e. when there is no image (stimulus) for the eye to focus on, for example, when the eye is either in complete darkness, or looking at a bright empty field. If the eye lacks this stimulation, the lens is shifting to a resting state.

Resting State of Accommodation of the Human Eye

In this condition, the eye is usually focused at an intermediate point (about 80 cm on average, although there are large variations up to few metres), thus the healthy human eye becomes myopic.