Failing to Foresee     http://tinyurl.com/y7j3e99z 

Putting the MH370 probable cause into stark Regulatory Relief

The Main Document:   http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2

"MH370, Not really a mystery"

Exec Summary: 

http://tinyurl.com/gqpnwcn

1 There are very few real surprises in an aircraft accident..... just conundrums. Normally, at the outset, there are simply mysteries within the carnage, many unknowns and investigatorial predicaments for further technical inquiry and tests - and they often turn out to be interlinked and associated with precedents and precursors. In spite of the red herrings, the harbingers of doom and press speculation, all investigations must hinge upon fact and discovery. After the Monday morning quarter-backing and conspiracy theories have subsided, these precedent incidents and accidents (if and once identified) can appear in hindsight to be almost inherently predictive - and thus avoidable. But to do this futuristic lunge, you must be prescient and have a nose for possibilities and probabilities. You need to extrapolate incidents into possible accidents in different circumstances. This is often "the step most failed" in investigations that supposedly claim to seek to avoid further instances of failure, human and technical.

Historical

When the ABX Air 767 burnt on the ramp in an oxygen fire in San Francisco on 28Jun2008, no lives were lost. Therefore the event attracted less attention and press coverage than it otherwise would have. The investigators did a good job, up to a point. But the potentials beyond that point were as obvious as the nose on your face. Where the NTSB failed was in its follow-through. In short, they didn't - and neither did the FAA or Boeing. It was an across-the-board institutional failure. Therefore when an Egyptair 777-200 was destroyed in an almost identical fire on the ramp at Cairo Airport on 29Jul2011 (i.e.3 years later), it was almost a regulated deju vu of corporate inaction. Nobody thought to consider what might have happened to an aircraft at cruise altitude in a similar circumstance.... and just how it might lethally differ. The theory here in "MH370, Not really a mystery" has sought to explain away all the myth, musings and mystery of that 08 Mar 2014 accident, using simple logic - and building upon the prior accidents for a cornucopia explanation of all aspects of what could've happened..... blow by blow.

However just when you think you've covered all those possible contingencies, a few years later downtrack, someone at the FAA is provoked into quietly (but necessarily) raising yet another intimately related anomaly. We are so often informed that Potassium Superoxide generated oxygen cannisters' masks in the passenger compartment will drop down in the event of a depressurization, that we overlook the fact that the 777-200 also has a different system, one that's the self-loading cargo's equivalent of the pilots' supplementary oxygen system up on the flight-deck. In other words, as a pax you don't always need to activate a chemical generator by pulling a mask-attached piping lanyard, you can have a very similar diluter demand system to the pilots' pressure demand supply - and one that was also unfortunately bottle-fed via the potentially lethal electrically conductive LP hoses.

The developed theory in "MH370, Not really a mystery"  is an airborne cruise altitude logical sequitur to the afore-mentioned 767 and 777 ramp accidents. It envisages a hull burn-thru depressurization of the aircraft i.e. the MH370 hull being holed on the flight deck (per the 767 and 777 ramp fires). But when the FAA suddenly (in late 2016) announces that the same Egyptair 777 "probable cause" that (post-MH370) initiated the replacement of an electrically conductive low-pressure oxygen hose on the flight-deck of ALL BOEING Models, has also always existed in another 777 passenger oxygen system and thus needs "a fix" - then we are in a bigger ball-game. The Press [en masse] missed making this connection to MH370 and the ever increasing credibility of the "Not really a Mystery"  explanation for the MH370 "ghost flight" enigma.

In fact the World Press never identified the large headcount of oxygen hose fire AD's in cell #4 below - a segmentary FAA fleet-wide addressing of a lethal flaw that had existed, unaddressed, for many years in all Boeing airliners... and even included the 787.

Read the text of their late 2016 Airworthiness Directive below. Some would say that for this revelation to come to light some 2 years after MH370 was lost is consistent regulator behaviour - but nevertheless, it just beggars belief. Look below at cell #4 and note the dates of the very large number of AD's that suddenly, i.e. post-MH370, addressed that same issue of electrically conductive oxygen hoses. Could you possibly say that it's all merely coincidental? Or can you hear the stealthy closing of an industry barn door? 

Whilst there are insufficient facts and nil data to support this surmise, you can always credibly revert to: "If it looks like an owl, hoots like an owl, flies at night and hunts mice, it just could be an owl."

 

2 Even More Oxygen for the "Not Really a Mystery" Theory

Dated 31 Aug 2016 and with a "with effect" date of 15 Sept 2016 (two weeks later, i.e. "rushed"), that FAA AD2016-18-02 says:

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen. This AD was prompted by a determination that the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system can potentially be conductive. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system, which can cause the flex hoses to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the passenger cabin.

The gaseous passenger oxygen system equipped with therapeutic oxygen is not continuously pressurized and must be activated by the flightcrew. Exposure to electrical faults, such as unintended short circuits, can result in localized electrical heating of the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses. This condition, if not corrected, could result in electrical current passing through the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses, which can cause flex hoses to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the passenger cabin.

We reviewed Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-35-0041, dated April 8, 2016. The service information describes procedures for replacing the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen.

FAA's Determination

We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.

3 An Inconclusive Conclusion

So when considering all the likelihoods, explanations and ongoing additive FAA morsels within the "MH370, Not Really a Mystery" theory, you may conclude that we have just passed the "hoots like an owl" stage of  practical hindsight. But, as an aside: " such as unintended short circuits"  (“unintended” - really?)

The augment for the next step in constructive belief lies within the AD concoction below (note the extracts, the significant dates, the total Boeing model coverage - plus the highlighting and commentary):

 

4 Applicable FAA AD's: (all concerned with electrically initiated LP oxygen hose fires in all models of Boeings)
707/720/727/737 747 757 767 777 787
2014-16-09 2010-16-05 2010-06-17 2010-16-04 2016-18-02

2014-23-12

  2001-24-29   2013-07-09 2013-NM-108-AD  
  2013-07-09   98-23-05 2012-13-05  
        2013-08-09  
       

2014-09-06

 
post  MH370

2014-16-09 (effective 23 Sep 2014) covers all Boeing models prior to 747

  757 and 767 AD's above attribute the experienced fire risk to an adjacent intercom/audio select panel. Were they mistaken and simply missed the electrically conductive oxygen hose explanation?

Citations:

"AD results from reports of low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit in an adjacent audio select panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses used in the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen systems to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire."

and (similarly mistaken?)

"..requires an inspection to detect damage of the wire bundles in the left side of the flight compartment in the vicinity of the stowage box for the captain's oxygen mask, and repair, if necessary; a continuity check on repaired wires; installation of sleeving over the wire bundles; and rerouting of the wire bundles. This amendment requires modifications of the captain's and first officer's consoles in the flight compartment to ensure adequate clearance between oxygen equipment and adjacent wire bundles. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that chafed wiring and wire insulation wear occurred in the vicinity of the stowage box for the captain's oxygen mask due to interference between oxygen line fittings and adjacent wire bundles. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such chafing and inadequate clearance, which could result in electrical arcing and consequent oxygen leakage in the vicinity of the stowage box; these conditions, if not corrected, could result in a fire in the flight compartment."

2014-09-06  was issued 3 months after MH370 was lost

AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the stowage box and supernumerary ceiling area. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn and lead to an oxygen-fed fire near the flight deck.

DATES: This AD is effective June 5, 2014.

 

AD was prompted by a report indicating that, on a different Boeing airplane model, there was an oxygen-fed fire, which caused extensive damage to the flight deck. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive hoses in the crew oxygen system. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or smoke beneath the flight deck in the forward electronics equipment bay.

DATES: This AD is effective December 31, 2014.

*Request To Shorten Compliance Time

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) stated that it supports the intent of the NPRM (79 FR 17457, March 28, 2014) but that the 60-month compliance time is excessive. ALPA recommended that the compliance time be shortened. ALPA did not provide justification for its request, or propose what the shorter compliance time should be.

(ALPA: 20 days after MH370 - i.e. they weren't dumb (just being coy) about their inhouse suspicions on a possible MH370 cause!!