| Failing to Foresee
http://tinyurl.com/y7j3e99z
Putting the MH370 probable cause into stark Regulatory Relief |
The Main Document: http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2 | Exec Summary: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 1 | There are very few real surprises in an aircraft accident..... just
conundrums. Normally, at the outset, there are simply mysteries within
the carnage, many unknowns and investigatorial predicaments for further
technical inquiry and tests - and they often turn out to be interlinked and
associated with precedents and precursors. In spite of the red herrings,
the harbingers of doom and press speculation, all investigations must
hinge upon fact and discovery. After the Monday morning quarter-backing
and conspiracy theories have subsided, these precedent incidents and
accidents (if and once identified) can appear in hindsight to be almost
inherently predictive - and thus avoidable. But to do this futuristic
lunge, you must be prescient and have a nose for possibilities and
probabilities. You need to extrapolate incidents into possible accidents
in different circumstances. This is often "the step most failed"
in investigations that supposedly claim to seek to avoid further
instances of failure, human and technical. Historical When the ABX Air 767 burnt on the ramp in an oxygen fire in San Francisco on 28Jun2008, no lives were lost. Therefore the event attracted less attention and press coverage than it otherwise would have. The investigators did a good job, up to a point. But the potentials beyond that point were as obvious as the nose on your face. Where the NTSB failed was in its follow-through. In short, they didn't - and neither did the FAA or Boeing. It was an across-the-board institutional failure. Therefore when an Egyptair 777-200 was destroyed in an almost identical fire on the ramp at Cairo Airport on 29Jul2011 (i.e.3 years later), it was almost a regulated deju vu of corporate inaction. Nobody thought to consider what might have happened to an aircraft at cruise altitude in a similar circumstance.... and just how it might lethally differ. The theory here in "MH370, Not really a mystery" has sought to explain away all the myth, musings and mystery of that 08 Mar 2014 accident, using simple logic - and building upon the prior accidents for a cornucopia explanation of all aspects of what could've happened..... blow by blow. However just when you think you've covered all those possible contingencies, a few years later downtrack, someone at the FAA is provoked into quietly (but necessarily) raising yet another intimately related anomaly. We are so often informed that Potassium Superoxide generated oxygen cannisters' masks in the passenger compartment will drop down in the event of a depressurization, that we overlook the fact that the 777-200 also has a different system, one that's the self-loading cargo's equivalent of the pilots' supplementary oxygen system up on the flight-deck. In other words, as a pax you don't always need to activate a chemical generator by pulling a mask-attached piping lanyard, you can have a very similar diluter demand system to the pilots' pressure demand supply - and one that was also unfortunately bottle-fed via the potentially lethal electrically conductive LP hoses. The developed theory in "MH370, Not really a mystery" is an airborne cruise altitude logical sequitur to the afore-mentioned 767 and 777 ramp accidents. It envisages a hull burn-thru depressurization of the aircraft i.e. the MH370 hull being holed on the flight deck (per the 767 and 777 ramp fires). But when the FAA suddenly (in late 2016) announces that the same Egyptair 777 "probable cause" that (post-MH370) initiated the replacement of an electrically conductive low-pressure oxygen hose on the flight-deck of ALL BOEING Models, has also always existed in another 777 passenger oxygen system and thus needs "a fix" - then we are in a bigger ball-game. The Press [en masse] missed making this connection to MH370 and the ever increasing credibility of the "Not really a Mystery" explanation for the MH370 "ghost flight" enigma. In fact the World Press never identified the large headcount of oxygen hose fire AD's in cell #4 below - a segmentary FAA fleet-wide addressing of a lethal flaw that had existed, unaddressed, for many years in all Boeing airliners... and even included the 787. Read the text of their late 2016 Airworthiness Directive below. Some would say that for this revelation to come to light some 2 years after MH370 was lost is consistent regulator behaviour - but nevertheless, it just beggars belief. Look below at cell #4 and note the dates of the very large number of AD's that suddenly, i.e. post-MH370, addressed that same issue of electrically conductive oxygen hoses. Could you possibly say that it's all merely coincidental? Or can you hear the stealthy closing of an industry barn door? Whilst there are insufficient facts and nil data to support this surmise, you can always credibly revert to: "If it looks like an owl, hoots like an owl, flies at night and hunts mice, it just could be an owl."
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| 2 |
Even More Oxygen for the
"Not Really a
Mystery" Theory Dated 31 Aug 2016 and with a "with effect" date of 15 Sept 2016 (two weeks later, i.e. "rushed"), that FAA AD2016-18-02 says: SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen. This AD was prompted by a determination that the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system can potentially be conductive. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system, which can cause the flex hoses to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the passenger cabin. The gaseous passenger oxygen system equipped with therapeutic oxygen is not continuously pressurized and must be activated by the flightcrew. Exposure to electrical faults, such as unintended short circuits, can result in localized electrical heating of the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses. This condition, if not corrected, could result in electrical current passing through the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses, which can cause flex hoses to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the passenger cabin. We reviewed Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-35-0041, dated April 8, 2016. The service information describes procedures for replacing the low-pressure oxygen flex hoses with new non-conductive low-pressure oxygen flex hoses in the gaseous passenger oxygen system in airplanes equipped with therapeutic oxygen. FAA's Determination We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. |
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| 3 | An Inconclusive Conclusion So when considering all the likelihoods, explanations and ongoing additive FAA morsels within the "MH370, Not Really a Mystery" theory, you may conclude that we have just passed the "hoots like an owl" stage of practical hindsight. But, as an aside: " such as unintended short circuits" (“unintended” - really?) The augment for the next step in constructive belief lies within the AD concoction below (note the extracts, the significant dates, the total Boeing model coverage - plus the highlighting and commentary):
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| 4 | Applicable FAA AD's: (all concerned with electrically
initiated LP oxygen hose fires in all models of Boeings)
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