|Note that the ACTUAL main document (with links) is at http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2|
|MH370 - Forewarned is forearmed - (except when inept inaction is the norm) - in our plastic push-button world|
link below have likely been deleted by Pprune moderators
(A Logical and Lateral Thinking Approach Required?) - access this (with imagery) at http://tinyurl.com/mh370-mostLikelyCause or
http://tinyurl.com/lrhentv (this page)
see also: http://tinyurl.com/ngjdd8m
Any Occam's Razor approach to the fate of MH370 would be considering the oxygen flare fire over three years ago at Cairo airport (see imagery) - as the paramount and pre-eminent clue. An Egyptair 777 was destroyed. This is particularly relevant as the FAA only got around to publishing its corresponding final rule Airworthiness Directive in mid April this year (well after MH370 disappeared) - as a means of enforcing adoption of the slightly earlier Boeing Service Bulletin. That Cairo fire penetrated the cockpit RHS sidewall. Airborne, this hull rupture would have caused a rapid depressurization - as well as quickly allowing depressurization outflow air (followed by the inflow of slipstream air) to instantly dissipate enriched oxygen levels and blow out any residual smouldering .... if it had occurred inflight at 35,000ft. After self-extinguishing, the degree of damage may have visually appeared quite nominal or minimal - except for some sooting and the pierced sidewall and one other critical aspect for aircraft control and communication (amplified below).
The image (see link or image below) of the Egyptair 777's seriously damaged cockpit indicates a worse fire than would have occurred airborne. This was because the Cairo firemen took a lot longer to intervene than would be acceptable elsewhere - and because the evacuation of personnel took priority.... so the fire took hold. However the oxy blowtorch effect of the fire's burning its way through the cockpit sidewall would've been the same in both cases (i.e. a blowtorch is a blowtorch at any height - as it is supported and sustained by its own oxygen supply). Don't confuse the sudden flare-up of an oxygen fire with the sort of fuel-fed sustained and spreading fire that brought down Swissair 111 (i.e. its fire was fed by airflows behind the cabin linings propagating fire courtesy of the highly flammable and ubiquitous MPET thermal acoustic insulation. MPET = metallized mylar). The oxygen flare fire, by contrast, can be compared to an oxygenation flash-over or backdraft experienced momentarily when unwisely opening a door in a burning building. An oxygen flare fire is a very sudden onset short duration conflagration, in comparison with (say) the Swissair 111 fire. The Swissair pilots had 15 to 20 minutes from detecting fumes to their crash. Lithium Ion battery sustained inflight fires have always had similar slow-time onsets.... as well as being very hard to extinguish.
However the MH370 pilots may have been instantly burnt alive in their seats if both had been seated at the time of a wiring short-initiated oxygen fire. Oxy fires can peak at very high lung-searing temperatures - but subside quickly. The effect upon plastic components can be distortive to the point of meltdown. It's a function of peak temperature not just exposure time. The culprit was as simple as Boeing having utilized an electrically conductive stiffener wire in the interior of the pilots' oxy-hoses (i.e. a wire-spring helically wound inside a low-pressure oxygen hose to allow it to stretch and corner without a flow-limiting collapse or kink). But the use of an electrically conductive wire permitted a chafe-induced wiring short. This conclusion was reached quickly by the Cairo investigators - but maybe the luck stopped there? One has to wonder whether Boeing's whizz-kidz considered what may have occurred if airborne. Did they model or conceptualize that possibility? Was the Boeing Service Bulletin implemented on MH370 - i.e. did they change those concertina hoses or did the S.B. merely contain a suggested inspection for any anomalies - and low-priority scheduled it for the next major servicing? Accidents tend to emphasize solutions as to causality - but once that challenge is resolved, all involved de-prioritize the remedial cures until after a "proper" cost-benefit analysis and a program of Monte Carlo "repeatability and reproducibility" processing simulations. Fixes cost money and are universally unpalatable in commercial aviation. Suggested visual inspections (for chafing, say) constitute an "easy out" means of resolution. This can be seen time and time again in Service Bulletins and their formalizing EASA and FAA airworthiness directives. The underlying weasel philosophy is always that (tongue in cheek) "prevention is better than cure". But admittedly, some cures can introduce their own indeterminate bugs.
See the links below for discussion of the ramifications of an inflight oxygen fire. Most significant amongst these is the effect that such a fire would have upon the type of pedestal mount, glareshield and overhead console plastic pushbutton and rotary switch controls that you find in modern aircraft. These plastic pushbuttons and their recess surrounds can quickly melt differentially, distort and become non-functional in highly elevated temperatures of as little as 10 to 15 seconds exposure (the rough duration of an oxygen flare-up fire). By comparison, the metal toggle switches of yesteryear would've been relatively invulnerable to any such flash fire. Meltdown in a brief duration oxy flare fire was never factored into plastic pushbutton ops.
Note also that some switches are momentary contact (such as an R/T push-to-talk), some are electrically or mechanically latched by button depression (ON/OFF), others are rotary and some may function via permitting a pull-in solenoid to complete a permanent ground to an earth. Other types may be spring-latch released, fused together by a fire or even actuated (such as in a keypad's partial meltdown). It's a complex matter sorting out which pushbutton and its parent system would be affected (i.e. which systems would be activated, which de-activated and which would simply be rendered inoperative (i.e. disempowered) or just made inoperable)..... by a plastic pushbutton melting and/or any distortion of its housing. Much would depend upon the plastic pushbutton's distance from the seat of the fire and any intermediate shielding effect. It's an imponderable one that's not yet been a known factor in a modern day aviation incident or accident. Plastic meltdowns have (to-date) been incidental and noteworthy - but not causative when considering "ghost flight" instances.
Why would such an oxygen flare fire occur just when it did? We can imagine the following credible scenario:
a. Top of Climb (or just after, and settled down in the cruise in friendly weather) is a non-busy time for the captain to go down the back for a toilet or rest break. There are few distractions or ATC concerns once in the cruise phase. This personal routine could be individually confirmed as being the MH370 captain's typical modus operandi by querying other first officers with whom he'd flown the Beijing (and other) routes.
b. Having made his final call to Kuala Lumpur, the captain would push his seat back, unstrap and announce to the first officer that he was going aft. The F/O would acknowledge and take his oxygen mask out of its housing and don it as the captain proceeded aft, closing the flight-deck door behind him. Why would the F/O don his mask? That is Standard Operating Procedure globally whenever one pilot is left on the flight deck alone.... for obvious reasons.
c. Having donned his oxy-mask, the F/O would do as just instructed (by KL ATC), i.e. switched to his oxy-mask mike, switched frequency and called Ho Chi Minh City ATC. That call would not have gone out if either the oxy-mask mike switching (from lip-mike) or his R/T transmission had triggered the oxygen flare fire.
d. Either the microphone-switching or the transmission itself (or an F/O's oxy regulator selection) could have triggered the oxygen flare but whether or not the timing meant that the captain was still within the flight-deck might be inconsequential. Once out of his pushed-aft seat, he'd have been partly shielded from the flare and after it had subsided (about 5 to 15 seconds), he'd have had time to pre-select the heading to Pulau Langkawi thereby initiating the turn-back - before himself passing out due to hypoxia. For the pilots, an oxygen flare fire is a double "gotcha".... if the blowtorch effect ruptures the pressure hull.
e. The drop-down masks would've enabled the passengers to survive for ten to 15 minutes at FL350, however walk-around bottles would have enabled Flight Attendants some further period of consciousness. Whether they'd have been able to regain entry to the flight-deck and effect a much later course-change? Possible, even probable...... that the later course change to a Southern I.O. heading would've been within the limits of duration of their portable oxygen bottles. Flight attendants delivering food to the flight-deck would've been familiar with seeing the knob that pilots would rotate to make a heading alteration.
f. In another interpretation of the aftermath of such an oxy flare-fire, the captain may have regained his seat after the flare had subsided, disconnected the autopilot and donned his mask (not fully realizing that the flight-deck oxygen supply had been compromised). If the captain had dialled in a heading, then lowered the nose but not manually trimmed nose-down, when he soon passed out due hypoxia and relaxed is nose-down pressure on his yoke, the aircraft at its higher speed would have zoom-climbed up to 40,000 feet then dropped its nose (purely per the aerodynamics of such an event) and eventually regained wings-level flight at some lower altitude (approximating their original cruise altitude). Why would he not have trimmed nose-down? Pilots in modern airliners are used to CWS (and its pitch-axis auto-trim). CWS is "control wheel steering". The manual trim wheel doesn't come naturally to mind for requiring manipulation.... but "stuffing the nose down and getting to an oxygen friendly altitude" is beaten into their brains in simulator sessions as second priority to getting their oxy-masks on. Aviate/ Navigate/Communicate. It's likely that communication was the last thing to come to mind - as hypoxia intervened.
Whatever the sudden cascade of disruptions to MH370's systems may have been, they can best be explained by the predations of an oxygen flash-fire. It is likewise unsurprising that a ghost flight would be the consequence of such an event - due to either the death/incapacitation of the pilots, the inability to control or communicate (due melted pushbuttons and fire-crazed and sooted displays or obscured LED read-outs) ..... or simply the very restrictive time of useful consciousness once depressurization occurs at 35,000 feet (i.e. a T.U.C. that is measured in mere seconds). However one of the seated pilots (or one re-entering the flight-deck with a portable oxy-set) may have been able to pre-select a roll-out heading for Pulau Langkawi (nearest available airport) before ultimately succumbing to hypoxia or injury. MH370's subsequent southbound flight path may easily have been a consequence of an interim flight upset near the tip of Sumatra caused by flight through a cumulo-nimbus cloud-top. Who's to know? But it can't be ruled out as a course-altering explanatory mechanism. The position (latitudinally) on 08 March of the ITCZ band may be a clue here (see http://tinyurl.com/qj7djvf).
The impact of a functional or non-functioning autopilot is discussed in the links below. Even if the autopilot was knocked out (or deselected by the captain attempting an emergency descent), the 777 comes with an active flight control system. What this simply means is that, in the absence of significantly disruptive turbulence, a 777 flying autopilot OFF will quickly pick up a dropped wing and thus maintain a fairly consistent heading ad infinitum. Even after an encounter with a CB, the 777 would have the inherent stability to dampen its phugoid oscillations in pitch and settle down to a substantially consistent, trim-compliant flight-path and steady pitch attitude. Unaffected by pax or F/A movement up and down the cabin, the lack of a continually moving compensating trim would permit a quite consistent pitch attitude in relatively smooth air. Likewise it will (if the auto-trim is inert) climb gradually at a fixed pitch-trim setting - as fuel is burnt off.
This scenario in its entirety was addressed earlier in the links below. It represents one possible/probable/ but likely scenario for the unknown sudden events aboard MH370..... and its later onwards "ghost" flight to fuel exhaustion. Any presumption of an earlier splashdown due to a higher fuel consumption at a lesser/lower level than Flight-Level 350 is likely incorrect. If the "ghost flight" proceeded as depicted above, then the aircraft would have progressively climbed very fuel-efficiently to higher altitudes and achieved at least the "book" air nautical miles per pound fuel consumption. This ANMPP rate would place its fuel exhaustion point much further south than the amended search area that contained the (now) discredited ULB pinger contacts.
I consider this interpretation of Flight MH370's enigma flight to be more feasible than any other dissertation I have yet seen. There is precedent. Sometimes the explanation for a mystery can be elusive. In this instance it is rooted in a simple extrapolation of a prior well-inestigated tarmac event - but one with unconsidered airborne complexities.
regards (and not for nominal publication)
ex Editor in Chief of Air Safety Week (PBI Media)
and veteran P3 Orion pilot (RAAF, RAF, RSAF, BAe)
http://www.pprune.org/8476325-post10714.html (main theory)
Final Rule as a result of the Egyptair 777 on-ground fire at Cairo was
only released by FAA a few days ago (i.e. the initiating ramp incident
was in Cairo to an Egyptair 777 over three years ago).
See the attached image below. I'm banned from Pprune.org (sob). They've now made it permanent.
Danny Fynne (Captain Pprune) really screwed Pprune and its forum members (and the public) when he sold it down the river to the industry's vested interests. But they wanted control of it so much that they made him (Danny) a magnificent offer that he couldn't refuse.
They are just so arrogant. But then again they only operate Pprune on behalf of its new owners - and Pprune is not the only site they censor. Why? Because that is their function and business plan.
What do they have to hide and on whose behalf? I think the answer is evident....and evidently they are also spying on private emails as well.
Why are they so afraid of my MH370 theories? (http://tinyurl.com/lrhentv) updated 2 June 2014
I think you might also know the answer to that. Boeing, the FAA and others don't want this aspect addressed at all.... and they now own Pprune by proxy, operating it via IB Internet Brands' censorship.
Que sera. I think that MH370 has revealed just what a charlatan industry mouthpiece Pprune has now become.
- IB Internet Brands
(Terms and Conditions for poster censorship)
Pprune's [proxy operators] - their task is to protect and delete ( delete what? Anything their airline industry masters don't want to appear (and be read by the public) on this widely read pilots form)
"Internet Brands is the leading provider of website satisfaction and reputation management services."
The other side of this angst-ridden MH70 mystery is somewhat more
obscure - but incredibly malodorous. Pprune.org has been the outlet for
airline and military pilots for over two decades now. Ultimately the
factual pressures stemming from whistleblowers and cognoscenti became so
annoying to Boeing, Airbus, FAA (et al) that they made Danny Fynne
(Captain Pprune) an offer he couldn't refuse - and the whole shebang was
taken over by a US PR firm that specializes in suppression of
industry-injurious informations. You can track their identity down (and
even their rogues gallery of moderating malefactors) by following the
links on the site. They freely acknowledge in a roundabout way) that
this modus operandi is their raison d'etre. Since MH370 crashed,
they have been deleting professional pilot's posts en masse in order to
conceal any particularized facts or likelihoods related to MH370 - facts
that could be picked up by victim's families and translated into any
basis for litigation or further investigation or inquiry. I first joined
Pprune in 1998 so I am very familiar with these obverse developments.
Many pilots have given up on trying to be a voice of reason on that
forum. Their opinions are treated with disdain, deleted and even the
responses are being expunged. So the once prevailing pilots' forum has
been emasculated. This is a typical post-911 development. Whether they
should be allowed to censor with impunity is up to you - but I consider
their conduct to be reprehensible - and here I speak of the corporations
and organizations behind their PR Firm. The PR firm itself is only
complying with their disruption instructions from their "owners". It's
all very East German "Stasi-like".
Having read my "deleted" post above, you'd possibly agree that "killing it off" would've been a quite high priority for these suppressor "under-cover" operatives.
|http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/535538-malaysian-airlines-mh370-contact-lost-540.html#post8484394 (above post immediately deleted by Pprune moderators - aka "the Muzzlemen" )|