Ice on wings determined as cause behind
Colombian plane crash |
|
www.chinaview.cn 2005-11-28 12:45:07 |
Despite this "ice on wings" finding
(see below), the
cause is likely to have been a lack of
thrust caused by an engine inlet icing
build-up - enough to cause a loss of RPM,
perhaps a
generator to fall off line (under-frequency
trip) and cause flight
instruments to fail (leading to a loss of
control). As the aircraft descended that
inlet icing may have melted, allowed the
engines' RPM to climb back up and the
generator to reset. Unfortunately by that
time the aircraft may have been locked in a
disorienting deadly spiral dive. Wing icing
alone is unlikely to cause a loss of
control.
"The flight crew
stated that they had a dual engine flameout" |
For another explanation of this
power-loss/regain phenomenon see
this link and
this pdf file
BOGOTA, Nov. 27 (Xinhuanet)
-- Ice on the wings of a Colombian plane that
crashed on Aug. 16, killing the 160 people on
board, has been determined as a cause behind the
tragedy, according to the El Colombiano
newspaper.
The passenger plane's black box had
recorded the cabin crew discussing bad weather
conditions and the possibility of ice on the
wings, the newspaper reported on Sunday, citing
the US National Transport Security Board (NTSB).
The results were released after
investigations made by the NTSB using data
supplied by Venezuela's Air Accident
Investigation Committee.
The twin-engine McDonnell Douglas MD-82
aircraft of Colombia's carrier, the West
Caribbean Airways (WCA), was flying from Panama
City to Martinique, the French-owned island in
the Caribbean, when it crashed over Venezuela,
killing the 152 passengers and its eight crew
members on board.
The NTSB report said that "both engines
show evidence that the rotors were turning at
high speed at the moment of impact."
The crew had said it was not an
emergency, but had requested a new flight
altitude from Venezuelan controllers on the
ground.
"The report shows that what happened was
an accident: not problem with the plane, as the
media have said," WCA director general Captain
Jorge Perez told El Colombiano (from
this link) |
|
VENEZUELA RELEASES
FACTUAL INFORMATION ON AUGUST MD-82 CRASH
INVESTIGATION
*************************************************
On
August 16, 2005, West Caribbean Airways flight 708, an MD-82
(registration HK-4374X), crashed near Machiques, Venezuela while on a
charter flight from Panama to Martinique. All 160 persons aboard the
flight died in the crash.
The following information has been
released by the Comite de Investigacion de Accidentes Aereos (CIAA) of
Venezuela. All States assisting the investigation -- France, Colombia and
the United States -- agree with the factual findings. The NTSB is
distributing this information at the request of the Venezuelan
Investigator-in-Charge.
Wreckage
Movement of the
wreckage has been delayed due to very heavy rains in the area where the
airplane crashed. However, it should be moved to a secure area in
Maracaibo in the next few days. Once the wreckage has been moved,
additional inspections will be completed. Initial examinations on site
revealed:
--Ground scars indicate that the airplane impacted in a
nose up and slight right roll attitude. --Wreckage was distributed over
a triangle shaped area that was approximately 205 meters long and 110
meters at its widest point. --Both engines
exhibited indications of high-speed compressor rotation at the time of
ground impact. --The engine inlets, empennage and wing
leading edges showed no sign of pre-impact damage. --The horizontal
stabilizer was found at about the full airplane nose up position (about 12
units nose up).
Flight Recorders
The cockpit voice
recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) were downloaded at the
Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la Securite de l'Aviation Civil (BEA)
laboratory near Paris, France, during the week of September 5,
2005.
Both the FDR and CVR casings were severely damaged due to
impact forces. Both recorders operated until impact.
Flight Data
Recorder
The FDR protected module was in good condition and the
magnetic tape was extracted in good condition. The investigation has
gained good information from the recorder. However, several parameters
were not recorded as designed, including left engine pressure ratio (EPR),
pitch attitude, roll attitude, magnetic heading, and column
position.
The following events are recorded on the
FDR:
--The accident flight lasted about one hour from takeoff
to the end of the recording. --The flight reached its initial cruise
altitude of flight level (FL) 310 at about 6:25 UTC (universal coordinated
time). --At about 6:41 UTC, about 20 minutes before the end of the
recording, the airplane began a normal climb to FL330. It leveled off
at about 6:43 and accelerated to Mach 0.76. The right engine EPR was
consistent with normal climb and cruise values. --About 90 seconds
after reaching Mach 0.76 (6:49 UTC), the airspeed began to steadily
decrease. Timing works for a gradual build-up of engine inlet ice in
heavy cloud at height. The horizontal stabilizer moved from
about 2 units nose up to about 4 units nose up during this deceleration.
Autopilot
auto-trim (classic unnoticed loss of performance due to ice build-up and
consonant engine power losses.) --About 3 minutes and
30 seconds (6:57 UTC) from the end of recording, the Mach number reached
about 0.60. The autopilot was then disengaged and the airplane started to
descend from FL330. --As the airplane descended past about FL315, the
airspeed continued to decrease and the right engine EPR decreased to about
flight idle. --The airplane descent rate increased after passing
through FL310. --The airspeed reached a minimum of about 150 indicated
air speed (IAS) knots at about FL250. --Right engine EPR stayed at
approximately flight idle through the descent and even
increased several times, including shortly before the end of the
recording. Engine stuck at idle due to combo of inlet choke ice
build-up plus p1/p2 sensor iced over. As they descended into warmer air
the choking inlet ice started to melt and the EPR started rising although
the pilots had not noticed this "recovery" and just left the throttle back
at idle. --Once the airplane started to descend, the
horizontal stabilizer moved in increments to about 12 units nose up (which
is about full nose up trim) while descending through FL200. Sounds like
autopilot was left engaged and Vs mode used during descent (autopilot ran hoz stab to its limits in an attempt to
achieve the decreed min descent rate during the
descent)
Cockpit Voice Recorder
The CVR
protected module was partly opened due to impact forces. Overall, the
magnetic tape was in good condition, but the tape was partially cut due to
impact forces. The overall quality of the recording is poor, with many
areas of static and loud background noises. However, valuable data was
obtained.
Almost all crew discussions to communicate with each
other and with air traffic control (ATC), in Colombia and Venezuela, were
in Spanish.
The CVR recorded the last 32 minutes of the accident
flight.
The following events are recorded
on the CVR:
--At about 06:53 UTC (i.e. 4 minutes after the loss of cruise performance
had started to occur at time 0649 - see above),
approximately 8 minutes before the end of recording (while the airplane is
level at FL330) the flight crew discusses weather concerns that included
possible icing conditions. The flight crew also discusses turning on
engine and airfoil anti-ice. .......but if you don't
actually do that and the engine runs down (even just to flight idle or
below without flaming out), the engine's bleed air output will then be
insufficient to stop icing build-up - the only solution is then to very
quickly get out of icing by diving, not just drifting down at min descent
rate). i.e. over 4 mins after
performance loss had been noted by the DFDR, it was probably
already an irretrievable situation --About 3 minutes
and 30 seconds (6:57 UTC) before the end of the recording, the crew
requests and is cleared to descend to FL310. --About 3 minutes before
the end of the recording, an audio warning similar to altitude alert is
heard, followed 22 seconds later by a sound similar to stick shaker (autopilot had run
out of hoz stab adjustment and was trimming a/c into a stall)
(6:58 UTC) and then an aural stall warning alert. These warnings
sound continuously until the end of the recording. --The flight crew
requests subsequently lower altitudes of FL290, FL240, and finally 14,000
feet. --The flight crew does not declare an emergency, and they do not
refer to any checklist during the descent. (crew culture?
afraid of subsequent sacking/punishment, already thinking about covering
it all up, not realizing how serious their predicament
was?) --About 1 minute after the start of the sound
similar to the stick shaker, the flight crew states that they had a dual
engine flameout when asked by ATC if they had a problem. (Doubt the "dual flame-out. At least the right engine was
still running and its generator was on line - or lighting and comms
would've been down). The RH engine was just too choked with inlet ice to
produce thrust at height - and the throttle had been left at idle, crew
not realizing that thrust might be available as ice had part melted in the
descent. They'd assumed a flame-out because of the lower than normal flt
idle RPM (due ice-choke). They may have assumed that EGT seen was just
residual jet exhaust temperature. It's possible
that the overtaxed crew shut down the wrong engine (based on that LH
engine probably having been available to minimize their rate of descent,
although having been iced up to some extent. If they had, then the RH engine's generator would've
stayed on line, even though that engine's idle was likely somewhat below
flight idle (due to the inlet ice choke). But they would've had to have
later restarted that engine (not shown as a CVR event) because
"Both
engines exhibited indications of high-speed compressor rotation at
the time of ground impact." So why was there insufficient power available
from the LH engine? Did it continue to ice up in their
descent?
--Last radio transmission from the flight crew to
ATC was at about 07:00:11 UTC. (20 secs before impact) --About 8 seconds
before the end of recording, a ground proximity warning system (GPWS)
warning starts to be heard and continues to the end of recording. This would've alerted crew to prepare for a crash landing
attitude but unfortunately they hit rising terrain at night, albeit in a
nicely flared attitude. --The time from first sound
similar to stick shaker, to the end of the recording is about 2 minutes
and 46 seconds. Autopilot was disengaged only 3.5 mins before impact (i.e.
after 0657 - see above). Crew possibly overloaded and unaware of the fully
autopilot N.U. trimmed hoz stab (which would've been well iced at that
high AoA) --The end of the tape occurs at about
7:00:31 UTC.
Questions:
a. Is there a cross-bleed manifold valve that must be opened
so that engine/airframe de-ice/anti-ice is available from either engine
(or is each engine "self sufficient" only in respect of engine
anti-ice?)
b. Is there an MD82 SOP (or POH advice) that says to increase
Rate of Descent to clear icing conditions if a loss of performance is
noted in icing conditions?
c. At what stage is the RAT manually deployed? Will the RAT
work in heavy icing (or just ice up?)
d. They didn't complete any checklist. Which checklist
would've been appropriate for the scenario?
e. What was happening to the LH engine?
For
further information on the investigation and the contents of this release,
please contact Tcnel. Lorllys Ramos Acevedo, Directora, CIAA, Venezuela,
+58 (212) 201- 5491.
The information in this advisory has been
translated into French by the BEA and can be accessed at the following URL
:
www.bea.aero/francais/actualite/actu.htm The
information also will be available in Spanish (from the CIAA) on the
Safety Board's website Spanish-language page:
www.ntsb.gov/es/espanol.htm
answers on an email to james.smith@iinet.net.au
|