The IASA
Chairman’s NASA
Experience
(Mrs. Lyn S. Romano
“Meets” Discovery – “Up Close & Personal”)
Place: KSC
(Kennedy Space
Center – Florida)
Date: 29
May 2002
Time: 10:43AM (Security badge issued)
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Once you’ve read through my Report, I hope that you will hit this
link and look over some of the Shuttle Photos
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You will then be in good shape to
make an informed “comparison” with some airliner wiring photos (at this link)
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"In the press grandstand where I watched Discovery rise against the cloudless sky, the media hit the abort button on
cynicism. The Earth shook to the sounds of man, three
miles away. The candle lit. . . only someone
stripped of awe can leave a launch untouched.
— Jonathan Alter, 'Newsweek' magazine, 9 November, 1998
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Genesis
I was recently granted the
honor of being invited to Kennedy Space
Center (hereinafter referred to as
KSC). The purpose of this invitation was to enable me the
opportunity of inspecting the wiring of the
space shuttle – Discovery – during “her” 20-24 month maintenance mode, and it
was an experience I shall never forget, for many reasons.
Greeted at Orlando
Airport by Ms. Kim Knight (KSC), I
knew immediately I was a welcomed guest.
As we headed for KSC I had no real idea of what to expect, but Kim could
not have made me feel more welcomed and relaxed – something I desperately
needed as I tried to make sense out of how I “got here” in the
first place.
I cleared the first, of
many, security checkpoints at 10:43AM.
We navigated our way through the corridors of the
NASA building, stepped onto the elevator and
rode it up to the 5th floor for my
meeting with the gentlemen that I would spend the
next 6 hours with.
I had spoken to and corresponded with one of the
gentlemen I would be meeting with - on many occasions prior to my visit. He is
with Johnson Space
Center, located in Houston,
Texas (hereinafter referred to as JSC) and
he is responsible for the shuttle fleet’s
safety. I should mention here I had never had the
opportunity, before 29 May 2002,
to meet him personally. The other gentleman I
would be meeting, for the first time without the
benefit of previous contact of any kind, heads up the
electrical engineering group at KSC.
As I sat across the table
from these two men, with the
“over the top” expertise they
possess in their respective fields, I was
struck by the fact it took only minutes of
discussion for them to realize I possessed
more than a basic understanding of the wiring
issues confronting the world of commercial
aviation. It did not take long for them to
learn of my eagerness to be educated about the
same wiring concerns confronting them in their
realm. Not once did I feel they were
“assigned” to pay me lip service of any kind, to “get this over with” or “Give the
lady the fluff ‘n’ stuff treatment”. For that,
I am eternally grateful. I have had more than my share of that “fluff ‘n’ stuff
treatment” during the course of too many
meetings over the past three and a quarter
years.
The “plan” was to have lunch before heading over to inspect the
wiring of Discovery, but I suggested we skip lunch and head straight over to the
Orbiter Processing
Center, because I was more than
anxious to “get right to it”. Thankfully, they
agreed without hesitation, and we were off.
After clearing security, once again, I was led into the
building that houses – Discovery – during “her” down-time.
As I stood beneath this magnificent “bird”, staring up at the
thermal tiles that protect the
shuttle from burning up on re-entry, I could barely breathe,
let alone sort out the conflicting emotions of
what brought me here.
It did not take me too long to realize that it was the
229 souls who perished aboard swissair Flight 111 on 2 September 1998, when that American manufactured
aircraft, (an MD-11) plummeted into the cold,
dark waters in close proximity to peggy’s cove, in Nova
Scotia, Canada
brought me here. Each and every one of those human beings, who in my estimation
did not have to perish that night in such a horrific way, are/were exactly what
brought me here.
*To date, the final report
surrounding the crash of swissair Flight 111
has not been released by the Canadian
Transportation Safety Board (hereinafter referred to as the
CTSB). However, much of the CTSB’s
investigation has focused on:
1.
The wiring of that aircraft (from type to installation)
2.
The In-Flight Entertainment System’s wiring and
installation
3.
Inadequate wire testing standards
4.
Inadequate material flammability standards
….as well as a myriad of other
aviation safety issues not in effect at the
time of the swissair crash, which could have
possibly prevented this particular aviation disaster from occurring. Due to these
facts, I cannot accept (as many in aviation circles seem to have), that the
crash of swissair 111 was in fact, just an accident*.
Differences - and No Indifference
This
clarified for me just how I ended up at NASA. I suppose I was meant to witness
first hand how NASA is addressing the wiring
concerns they have been confronted with, in
order to see for myself what they had been
telling me for several months, since my initial communication with the
gentleman at JSC. What was he telling
me? Specifically, NASA is most concerned with providing the
human beings that board their shuttles the
highest level of safety humanly possible. The safety they
deserve. We all know disasters happen, BUT, when there
are means to ensure the safest possible
environment, either in the
commercial aircraft realm or the space shuttle
realm, they need to be aggressively
undertaken, something NASA has chosen to act on and not just talk about.
Talking about it, rather then
acting aggressively seems to be the course the
commercial realm of aviation has chosen instead.
To give you a “snapshot” of Discovery, here are “her”
statistics:
WING SPAN: 23.79
meters
LENGTH: 37.24
meters
HEIGHT: 17.27
meters
PAYLOAD BAY: 18.3
meters x 4.6 meters
PAYLOAD WEIGHT (launch max): 24,948 kilograms
MAIN ENGINE (each)
THRUST @ 100% THROTTLE
SETTING:
SEA LEVEL: 1,670
kilonewtons
VACUUM: 2,100
kilonewtons
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
LENGTH: 47
meters
DIAMETER: 8.4
meters
GROSS WEIGHT (full) 750,980
kilograms
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRB – Each):
LENGTH: 45.46
meters
DIAMETER: 3.7
meters
THRUST @ LIFTOFF: 14,685
kilonewtons
GROSS WEIGHT (approx): 589,670
kilograms
Having taken a long look at the
thermal tiles from beneath the
shuttle, it was time to walk up the steps of the
scaffolding that surrounded Discovery, to clear another
security checkpoint, enter the air wash
chamber, then don our “Bunny Suits” (A “Bunny
Suit” is what I am wearing in the photos that
accompany this report) before being granted access to crawl into the
shuttle Discovery. All those tasks now complete – I find myself standing in the
Midbody portion of the shuttle. I cannot
possibly put into words the feelings
associated with that moment. Therefore, I will report only on what I saw – and
not what I was feeling at that time.
To my right, upon entering the
shuttle is the crew’s bathroom. Just beyond
that, still on my right, is an opening revealing the
Payload Bay.
This cavernous, empty, bay area is beyond my scope. What was it they
told me? How many school buses fit into this area? That’s just to give you an
idea of the enormity of “space” I am referring
to when confronted with this portion of the
space shuttle. Once I was able to pull myself away from the
Payload Bay
area, the electrical engineer lifted a floor
panel in the Midbody section to reveal the
work they are accomplishing in their
ongoing modifications to the wiring contained
throughout this ship. “The Belly” is how I would refer to this portion of the
shuttle.
NASA Refuses to
“wear a Wire”
Some of the configuration
changes being tended to are in the area of the
Midbody Crossover Bracket Redesign. Wire trays have been redesigned to
“eliminate interference that has existed between the
Orbiter Midbody Centerline Purge Duct and the
wire harnesses
contained in the mainframe crossover trays”.
This is being accomplished by the use of
tie-wraps and harness routing as well as a Teflon wrap
to protect the harnesses in contact areas.
Wire bundles will rest on vulcanized rubber, providing another
measure of safety.
The fleet wiring investigation (which NASA takes very
seriously) “gave birth” to the redesign of these
wire trays. They specifically curve around the
Purge Duct and allow the harnesses to be
mounted on the far side of the
tray. This is being accomplished not only as an enhanced safety measure, but
also to accommodate future growth.
As I look around the
Midbody section, I can see how much attention is being paid to ensure the
bend radius of the wiring is smooth, as it
“snakes” its way up, around and through the
craft. Adequate wire separation is also apparent. This being a very “hot topic”
item of discussion in the commercial aviation
realm recently, I was quite impressed to see this vital safety enhancement
already being tended to by NASA.
The pristine conditions stunned me. Considering Discovery is
in the heavy maintenance mode, I would have
expected far less – I was more than pleasantly surprised to learn quite the
opposite. Although I have never been personally granted a physical, visual
inspection of a commercial or cargo aircraft (and not for a lack of trying – I
assure you) I have seen many photographs and have been delivered many written
reports by experts in the aviation safety
field who have. Those photos and reports would shock the
average airline passenger. Comparing the
shuttle in a heavy maintenance mode, to the
reports and photographs I have seen detailing commercial aircraft (and I am not
referring to a heavy maintenance mode in the
commercial realm here, but those aircraft allowed to be transporting passengers
on a daily basis) all I can report is that there
is NO comparison.
There was not a speck of dust, lint, metal shavings or build
up of “gunk” on any of the wire bundles I saw
– on either the
very visible bundles, or the ones within the
“Belly” of the shuttle, which is considered a
less than accessible area. Therefore, the
condition of the wiring I was granted to
inspect on Discovery, even during this drastic maintenance mode, reassured me
that the visual inspections NASA wire experts
carry out are far more realistic and effective than any visual inspection that
is carried out on a commercial airliner. I must reiterate at this point, I have
never been granted access to a commercial/cargo aircraft during the
same type of maintenance mode, and therefore,
I can only base my findings on what I have been delivered by way of photographs
and reports that have been directed my way by the
experts in the commercial aircraft/aviation
safety realm.
Having completed my inspection of the
“Belly” and Midbody portions of Discovery, we head up the
stairs to the Flight Deck. It was an awe
inspiring experience for me to be standing in the
spot where Discovery will, after having completed “her” 20-24 month down time,
be once again navigated through space by one of our incredibly brave astronaut
teams. Considering that experience would be far too difficult for me to put
into words, I will continue with reporting what I saw, rather
than what I felt.
The close quarters were mind boggling, bordering on claustrophobic.
Looking up and seeing the “portals” through
which the Discovery crew will once again “slip
out” into space to accomplish whatever task is assigned, was awesome. A portion
of the ship’s wiring here is of Russian
origin/design. Any work needing to be attended to on this particular wiring is
not undertaken at NASA, but in Russia.
The bundles run through the
shuttle into pressurized zones – another vital
area NASA tends to in “over the top” detail.
I cannot tell you how long (in minutes or hours) I spent on
Discovery – Discovering for myself up close and personal, how everything I had
heard from NASA before arriving for this inspection had just been confirmed.
NASA takes the wiring issues that confront their
particular realm of aviation very seriously and I am convinced they
are doing everything humanly possibly to ensure a safe environment for the
human beings they launch into space. Not only the
Americans they send “up there”,
but all the human beings in “their
charge”. I find it very unfortunate not to be able to say the
same for the commercial side of aviation –
from the manufacturers to the
airlines to the regulators that “cry” safety
first and foremost.
No Cost/Benefit Sums Added Here
Astronauts and the Space
Station (ISS) crews who board our shuttles for
destinations we will most likely only be able to absorb through our
imaginations, are not referred to as “occupied seats”.
There is no price tag on their life and Cost
Benefit Analysis (hereinafter referred to as CBA) has no place. Passengers
boarding a commercial airliner are referred to as PAX or “occupied seats”. The
price tag for a human life on board a commercial airliner is $2.7 million
dollars, and a CBA approach to civil aviation disasters is considered an
acceptable/necessary “tool”. To clarify this just a bit, for those unaware, CBA
is the statistical methodology utilized to
determine which aviation safety measures are cost effective to implement and
which are not. Basically, if $2.7 million X the
number of human beings killed in an aviation disaster
is determined to be less expensive then the
cost of implementing a specific safety enhancement – it is not deemed cost
effective and therefore is not considered
practical. The bottom line is then that the
measure does not get implemented. To summarize, it’s far less expensive for the
airlines or manufacturers to pay settlements AFTER a disaster, than to attempt
a real “fix” BEFORE the disaster. In aviation
circles this mindset is referred to as a Tombstone Mentality. Reactive instead of Proactive. Who is in charge of our
safety? The gentlemen I spent many hours with at NASA weren’t aware of this CBA
methodology, but I can assure you, they are
now – were you aware of this? You do have the
right to know, therefore, I felt compelled to
include this explanation in my report at this time.
It was now time to crawl out of the
shuttle and remove my “Bunny Suit” in order to inspect Discovery from the
outside, before heading down to the “tool
room”. “She” is as magnificent from the
outside, as “she” is on the inside.
Strict precautions have been put into place to ensure the
proper tool is used for the specific job
requiring its use. They are all precisely calibrated, all sealed in plastic
with detailed written instructions for the
tool’s specific use. If a maintenance engineer is handed a sealed plastic “tool
bag” that appears to have already been opened, he does not accept it. There is
also a time limit as to how long the tool can
remain out and they must be returned by the
specified time. No tool is allowed to dangle from a tool belt. This precaution
has been implemented to ensure (as much as possible) that no accidental damage
to the wiring takes place while work continues
in those specific areas of the shuttle. While
speaking with the gentleman in charge, I could
not help but think about the lives lost in the
Alaska Airlines Flight 261 disaster, apparently due to shoddy maintenance and
tool calibration practices for which the
Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter referred to as faa) were fully
aware. I wondered how much of an impact NASA’s practices would have had in
avoiding that particular disaster. Shades of the
earlier Valujet disaster, Alaska Airlines had already been in court for several
years, over the faa’s
“complaints” regarding what they believed to
be shoddy maintenance practices, so they were
fully cognizant of the difficulties the
airline seemed to be facing, tending to this most vital area of aviation
safety.
Once my conversation/education was complete with the
gentleman in charge of the “tool room”, we
made our way over to the wiring training
facility and I met with the man in charge of
training any and all who will come in contact with the
shuttle’s wiring.
In NASA a “Standard” is
a Criterion of Excellence not a Requirement for Conformity
Physical examples of wiring are displayed here to enhance
understanding about what is and is not acceptable when installing or
maintaining the wiring on the
shuttles. Also very useful for those who visually inspect the wiring. I
“flipped through” training manuals used and having already personally viewed the
Orbiter Wiring Training Video myself (a must for anyone at NASA who will be
working on any shuttle wiring) I was once again impressed at the
attention NASA has devoted to the wire systems
on the shuttle fleet.
The culmination of my “field inspections” could not have
been more profound. Upon completion of my visit to the
wire training facility, I was taken over to the
launch pad where Endeavor “sat”, encased in scaffolding awaiting
what was to be “her” launch the following day
(scheduled for 30 May 2002).
Once again I found myself not believing I was actually here.
I was educated about how the shuttle first
arrives at the pad – to when “she” launches.
The following day – Thursday, 30 May
2002, Endeavor was to launch (on “her” way to the
International Space Station) and I had been invited to witness this incredible
moment from Banana Creek, approximately four and a half miles away from the
exact site I was now being granted an up close and personal ‘visit’. The name
of the mission Endeavor was set to embark upon
the next day:
STS 111
The timing of my invitation to inspect the
wiring on Discovery, and to witness this particular launch was an incredible
coincidence that even those at NASA I mentioned it to were
stunned to learn of. swissair Flight 111, the
flight my husband Ray Romano took on 2
September 1998 – together with 228
other unsuspecting human beings – never made
it to their scheduled destination. Endeavor’s
scheduled launch – mission STS 111 – was ready to go the
very next day. Would I be?
Returning to the offices at
NASA – where I began the day approximately
five hours earlier, the three of us had the
opportunity to wrap up. It also gave me the
ability to deliver a summary (of sorts) as to what I will do with the
education and photos I had just been privileged to receive. The gratitude I
feel for the generosity of time and expertise
granted me during this visit by these two men
(not to mention all those involved in making this experience possible for me -
both at JSC as well as KSC) is something I will never be able to appropriately
express.
I did, however, have the
ability to explain to each of them that I
would be heading down to Washington DC the 12th
and 13th of this month (meetings were already scheduled prior to my
NASA visit) to meet with Mr. Sam Whitehorn (Senator Hollings chief of Staff)
and Mr. Nicholas Sabatini (recently appointed to the
position of Associate Administrator for Aircraft Certification at the
faa – stepping into the position vacated in the
Fall of 2001 by tom mcsweeny who left for a position with boeing) to deliver the
details of my inspection of the wiring on the
shuttle Discovery. I also told them I would
bring with me the photos depicting NASA’s
attention to wire safety, together with my
report.
It would be my fondest wish come true (in the
“life” I have been left with since the crash
of swissair Flight 111) if upon receipt of these
two items, the faa, as well as those in the
position to actually get aggressive attention focused on this most vital
aviation safety concern could be accomplished. If not these
findings, I certainly do not know what it will take to get the
attention that is so vital, but I have no intention of stopping there,
if I am still met with deaf ears. It is my firm belief that the
commercial arm of aviation should and must follow NASA’s lead…. for true
aviation safety’s sake.
The United States
government delivered $15 billion to the
airlines, following the atrocities that took
place on U.S.
soil 11 September 2001.
This was done to “bail out” the airlines when they
were faced with their financial slump post
911. Considering the age of many of the
commercial aircraft in the U.S. airline fleet,
and the fact that a major percentage of that
fleet contains not only dangerous wiring, but more than apparent lack of
attention to proper maintenance procedures (as compared to the
United States – NASA shuttle fleet), I feel compelled to take what I have
learned during my recent visit to Washington DC.
After seeing the work being
accomplished at NASA in respect of the wiring
issues confronting them, and considering the
budget constraints they have to work within in
order to tend to these necessary upgrades and
modifications, I cannot help but wonder where the
$15 billion would have accomplished far more. NASA, or
civil aviation? If NASA can take the
aggressive measures they are concerning the
wiring issue, the action I have now seen for
myself, what does it take to get the same response
time/attention in the civil aviation world?
More people killed? That would certainly “up” the
costings in the Cost
Benefit Analysis mindset, but I daresay that is not a socially acceptable
answer.
Is it the United
States aviation industry, or those who
regulate it, intention to keep aging aircraft flying at any cost? Without
immediate and long overdue aggressive action to finally “make right” what has
long since been a “discussion topic” while more and more human beings are
needlessly killed? Will they be able to
continue to use the Cost Benefit Analysis
methodology when more and more of these aging
aircraft fall from the sky? No matter whether
it be on United States
soil or elsewhere around the world?
Considering the airline’s profit margins are
apparently less than acceptable at this time, will any of that $15 billion
‘grant’ delivered by the United States
government to the airline industry be put
towards the many safety issues that have been
allowed to fall by the wayside for far too
long already? Have the all too deadly wiring
issues that have been known about for at least 30 years been placed on the
“back burner” as they have been for too long,
now that the 911 atrocities make it easier for
them to disappear from the
‘agenda’? Will the United States be able to
remain the aviation “Super Power” it
(outwardly) has been, because it is simply receiving an “injection” of cash to
keep the aging aircraft fleet in the
sky – at the risk of human life? How many
human beings will it take to finally accomplish what should have been
accomplished by those “powers that be”, to finally have them
be able to state – truthfully – “safety first”? Thankfully, NASA seems to have
figured out the answers to most of these
questions, if not all of them.
The NASA Wakeup Call
NASA grounded their shuttle
fleet for six months in 1999, in order to inspect the
wiring after learning of unacceptable conditions
during one of their missions. I suppose they
were able to do that because they have the
motivation to do so, for several reasons.
They cannot risk the loss
of a shuttle, not only because the space
program (their “industry” if you will) would
suffer drastically, but there would also be
(most assuredly) loss of human life. A fact that always enters into their
safety discussions, at least the discussions I
have had with them. NASA’s motivation is not
profit – not in dollars and cents. I firmly believe NASA could find more than
appropriate ways to utilize the same
“injection of cash” the airlines were granted
post 911.
If the regulators,
manufacturers and airlines in the United
States (and around the
world for that matter) are as concerned with “safety first” as they
profess to be, than why has the wiring issue
been allowed to confront them to this very
day? Will the U.S.
be able to maintain their (outward)
superiority in the commercial aviation arena,
when more and more of those U.S.
manufactured aircraft fall out of the skies?
No matter where they happen to fall? Will the
regulators continue to allow these conditions
to flourish as they apparently have in the
past? Will they continue to pick and choose the
vital safety enhancements, utilizing the Cost
Benefit Analysis formula?
$2.7 million X the number
of human beings killed in an aviation disaster as their
bottom line?
I realize how unrealistic it is to expect a rewiring program
be put into effect for the aging aircraft
fleet in this country, or any county around the
world. Most especially post 11
September 2001. Therefore, what I hope to accomplish as I take the
information I was granted during my trip to NASA is simply this:
If NASA has the ability to
provide their shuttle crew the
level of safety they are aggressively seeking
– without a $15 billion “injection of cash” to make that happen - than
certainly the commercial realm of aviation,
from the manufacturer to the
regulators, to the airlines need to do the
same for the human lives they
have been given the responsibility to protect,
as much as humanly possible. After all, they
keep telling us how safety is their primary concern,
right? Now would be the time to finally show
us they mean what they
say. As NASA has shown me, not in words, but by their
aggressive action to do whatever’s humanly possible to ensure the
safety their crew so rightfully deserves. Are the
individual’s lives that board the shuttle
worth more than yours or mine?
One life is priceless, as I have said from 3 September 1998 to this day – and I
will continue to say that, because it happens to be a fact. I do not need to
rely upon Cost Benefit Analysis for my “findings”, as some in the
aviation world apparently do. NASA has figured that out as well. When will the
human beings that step onto a commercial aircraft be granted that same
assurance? If rewiring of aircraft in the
commercial realm is not realistic, then
shouldn’t the regulators compel the
airlines at the very least - - to deliver the
same pristine and meticulously maintained wiring in their
fleets as NASA has accomplished for their
shuttle fleet?
I would like to take this opportunity to thank each and
every individual at both JSC and KSC who went “above and beyond” what I could
have ever hoped for in order to make this trip not only possible, but one I
shall never forget.
It was my decision to withhold their
names from my report. I realize there might be
many aviation safety minded individuals – upon reading this report – who would
inundate their phone, fax and email lines –
with only good intentions of course. Considering what the
gentlemen and ladies employed by NASA (both at JSC and KSC) tend to on a day to
day basis, I felt it appropriate not to deliver any of their
names, in order to do my part in helping them
accomplish the continuing aggressive measures they
have undertaken towards real wiring safety.
God’s Speed,
Lyn S. Romano
Chairman
IASA/US (International
Aviation Safety Association)
Wife of Raymond M. Romano
Passenger on swissair Flight 111
Seat 9F
"Discovery is
seeing what everyone else has seen and thinking what no one else has
thought."
Albert Szent-Gyorgi
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